This past summer was Spain’s hottest on record. In Valencia, where I spent August, a series of ongoing heat waves regularly pushed the daily temperature past 97 degrees Fahrenheit. On most days it was too hot to be outside between 11 AM and 7 PM, and the muggy evening air offered little respite. Fires ravaged rural areas to the west and north, and caused the evacuation of villages near Madrid. Millions of trees burned. On my last night I was watching TV with the windows open when I noticed a carcinogenic smell. The sky outside was the color of ash, settling over a parched landscape. A fire had broken out in El Saler, a nature preserve and beach more than twenty miles away, and winds had carried the smoke inland.
It was a summer of crises for Spain, where a snap election on November 29 will determine whether the nation remains under one of Europe’s only left-wing coalition governments or succumbs to the rising right. Many of the European Union’s longstanding sources of tension—climate change, immigration, housing—have collided here with particular force. Like Italy, Greece, and other countries in southern Europe, Spain faces more urgent climate stresses than its northern neighbors. Some 74 percent of the country’s territory is at risk of desertification, while flash floods have devastated Valencia and water supply shortages continue to affect Catalonia. The 2024 floods killed 230 people; in the past three years more than 11,000 have died from excess heat.
Immigration has meanwhile become a central rift in the country’s politics. The majority of Spaniards support legal pathways for residency, but 72 percent oppose irregular migration. The ascendant far-right party Vox goes further, calling for “remigration” and adopting the campaign slogan “Ni uno más” (“not one more”).
This summer the issue became a political maelstrom. The catalyst was migration from Ceuta, a Spanish city on Africa’s northern coast that borders Morocco and faces the Strait of Gibraltar. (Ceuta itself was “given” to Spain by Portugal during the height of European colonialism in 1668.) In late July some 70,000 North African migrants, most of them Moroccan, crossed from Morocco to Ceuta over the course of two days. Many swam along the coast to avoid being stopped by immigration officers; nearly 150 people drowned. As European Union President Ursula von der Leyen panicked about the new arrivals, demanding even more militarized borders, Vox’s leader, Santiago Abascal, predictably issued a dog whistle, calling it “an invasion.” The episode prompted a surge of racist media coverage and online hate speech directed toward migrants.
Then, as September began, a housing crisis long in the making erupted. It was not a surprise. I had been coming to Valencia from Berlin regularly over the past three years, and I knew that much was changing in what had once been a relatively relaxed coastal city, where painters could still afford studios and the average almuerzo—the local meal between breakfast and lunch, characterized by a giant bocadillo, a coffee, and copious plates of peanuts and olives—cost six euros. Spanish friends in Valencia had been increasingly displaced as landlords drastically increased rental costs; the average rent has doubled in the last five years. In Madrid, which has always been one of Spain’s most expensive cities, rents have also skyrocketed, now exceeding 70 percent of the average worker’s salary. Across the country, the average person paid at least 50 percent of their income toward housing in 2025.
On September 23 police evicted an eighty-seven-year-old woman named Maricarmen Abascal (no relation to the Vox leader) from the Madrid apartment her family had rented for seven decades. Maricarmen, as she was widely known, resided in the central Retiro neighborhood, where she had long paid around €500 for her rent-controlled flat and utilities, living on her €1,350-a-month pension, the average social security stipend. Six years ago a Madrid real estate firm named Urbagestión purchased her building, set the new rent at €2,650, and claimed that Maricarmen’s lease was invalid because it had been passed from her father to her mother and then to her. (Under Franco-era laws, the wife could not be listed on the original contract.) As the case became a cause célèbre, the company seemed set on garnering ill will, turning down offers from an anonymous writer who wanted to pay the rental difference for the rest of Maricarmen’s life and from Spain’s housing minister, who tried to purchase the apartment.
Protestors, many of them students, camped out in Madrid’s Puerta del Sol square for weeks in anticipation of an eviction, ultimately numbering some one thousand people. By the morning of September 23 the state had attempted three times to evict Maricarmen and failed due to legal appeals and public pressure. This time they persisted. Images of riot-uniformed officers breaking into her apartment and then paramedics carrying her out on a stretcher ricocheted around the world; in Spain they galvanized a wave of new demonstrations in Barcelona, Valencia, Palma, and Cáceres. A few days later Urbagestión relented and offered to let Maricarmen resume the lease for an undisclosed figure close to her previous rent, but it was too late; she died on October 7 in Madrid’s Gregorio Marañón Hospital before she could return home. In her last public statement she said: “keep fighting for what is yours.”
These overlapping social ruptures have put Spain’s long-serving prime minister, Pedro Sánchez, in a particularly difficult position. Since the Madrid-born economist improbably became the country’s leader in 2018, when his Socialist Party (PSOE) held only eighty-four of the 350 seats in Congress, he has weathered multiple crises within both the nation’s fractured political system and the country at large. Spaniards often sum up his skill at getting out of political trouble with the saying “tener una flor en el culo”—“you have a flower in your ass.”
Outside of Spain, Sánchez has emerged as a progressive icon over the past two years. In May 2025 he declared in parliament that Israel was a “genocidal state,” and a month later he called for the EU to suspend ties with the country. He was quick to push back against the US–Israeli war on Iran, denying the Americans use of their military bases on Spanish territory for armed conflict. This past September he met New York City Mayor Zohran Mamdani on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly for a morning breakfast event, “Building an Economy for the Many.”
Inside Spain, however, Sánchez is seen less as a leftist firebrand than as an Obama-esque centrist defined by his pragmatism and charm. He is extraordinarily skilled at dealing with the media, often turning his opponents’ insults to his advantage. When the right began calling him “Perro Sánchez” or “Perro Sanxe” (Sánchez the Dog) years ago, he and his political team reclaimed the image—most recently in late October, when Sánchez appeared on the talk show La Revuelta and gifted the host David Broncano a dog-shaped cookie jar. When he published an autobiography in 2019, he called it A Manual of Resistance.
These tactics, however, have not been enough to overcome the fact that Sánchez has faced especially difficult political headwinds in recent years. In snap general elections in 2023 the PSOE came in second behind its main opponent, the center-right People’s Party (PP). Sánchez managed to form a new governing coalition and gain a third term, but the PP controlled the Senate, and Sánchez’s majority grew more unstable as it expanded to include smaller forces, notably the Catalan pro-independence party Junts. Since then Sánchez has struggled to pass ambitious legislation or even a functioning budget, facing opposition from the right (the PP and Vox), the Catalan separatists (primarily Junts), and the left (primarily Podemos, the anti-austerity party founded in 2014).
In recent months Sánchez has attempted to play his political cards as best he can. This summer he visited the fire-damaged areas, called for a national political agreement on climate, and launched a national climate-shelter network. As the Ceuta crisis erupted, he tried to strike a balance between taking a humane tone—praising border guards who had let people through as opposed to causing more deaths—and swiftly facilitating mass returns, even as EU heads of state blamed the incident, without evidence, on his decision earlier in the year to allow undocumented migrants a pathway to regularize their status.
Lately he has staked his tenure on housing rights. Amid the Maricarmen protests, Sánchez proposed nationwide reforms to suspend evictions until 2030 and constrain rent increases, but the changes were predictably blocked in parliament by the PP, along with Vox and Junts. Three days later Sánchez called a snap parliamentary election. “You must decide,” he declared to the nation at large, “whether you want our country to move backwards or continue moving forwards, and whether you prefer a government that works for the interests of the majority of society.” Three-hundred and fifty seats in the Congress of Deputies are up for election on November 29, as well as 209 of 267 seats in the Senate. Whichever party receives the most votes will try to form a government; Congress will then vote on the prime minister.
Previously a nationwide election had been scheduled for next summer; Sánchez likely hoped to capitalize on the swell of public anger over housing to rally left-leaning voters. His opinion polls had been low for months. It could have been another flor en el culo moment, but in late October a high-speed train crash—the second of the year—killed sixty-nine people and shifted the national conversation at least temporarily from housing rights to administrative failures. For weeks the PP led predictions, though as of November 15 most polls showed an almost dead heat between them and the PSOE.
Should the PSOE win, Sánchez’s only chance at maintaining his coalition would be to forge alliances with leftist parties that have often criticized him, including Podemos, Frente Amplio (previously Sumar, a coalition of four parties with which he is currently in government), and three left-wing Catalan, Basque, and Galician parties: the ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya), EH Bildu (Euskal Herria Bildu), and the BNG (Galician Nationalist Bloc). He would also likely need the Catalan and Basque center-right parties, despite the fact that Junts recently killed his housing reforms. It’s unclear if even this fragmented coalition would provide Sánchez with the majority he needs to form a government: as of now Vox is polling at 19.8 percent, much higher than any of the leftist parties.
If the PP wins, they have indicated that they will likely form a governing coalition with Vox, whose leaders openly yearn for the return of a Christian country that rejects regional autonomy, restricts human rights, and promotes the heteronormative nuclear family. It would be the first time since Franco’s death in 1975 that the nationalist right regained power. In this sense the outcome of the election is existential not just for Sánchez but for the nation.
Sánchez is a long-term member of the PSOE, the historically working-class party founded in Madrid in 1879. Having first joined as a student, he served on the Madrid city council and in Congress, alternating between public service and academia, where he was an economics lecturer. Sánchez was virtually unknown nationally when he made a successful bid for party leadership in the PSOE primaries in 2014; his outsider status became part of his political identity. Today the PSOE is socially progressive and pro-EU. Fiscally it supports social-democratic policies that seek to alleviate inequality without radically overhauling the market-based system.
To its left are a variety of parties that would like to see more progressive measures. Podemos and Frente Amplio (formerly Sumar), for example, advocate for more aggressive taxes on the wealthy and corporations. On foreign policy, the PSOE commits to continued NATO membership, while Podemos and more recently Frente Amplio would like to see Spain withdraw; the PSOE has also gradually sided with Morocco over autonomy for Western Sahara, the territory that the North African country has occupied since Franco’s Spain withdrew from its former colony in 1975, while Podemos, Frente Amplio, and the ERC support independence for the region’s Sahrawi people. Then there are the smaller parties, like the ERC, that support Catalan, Galician, and Basque self-determination, which often puts them at odd with the PSOE’s vision of a united Spain. These are just a few of the policy differences dividing the left, which has also struggled with heated leadership rivalries. “More egos than seats” read a recent editorial in El Diaro from the commentator Lucía Taboada.
From the beginning of his national political career, Sánchez has been willing to forge unusual alliances, including with the right, rather than compromise with the left. In 2016 talks with Podemos broke down, in part because Sánchez simultaneously pursued a policy agreement with the center-right Ciudadanos. After an election in April 2019, when the PSOE won 28.7 percent of the vote and Podemos and its regional allies received some 14.3 percent, the two parties again failed to reach a pact to form a leftist government: negotiations collapsed primarily over cabinet posts and power-sharing. (They eventually reached an agreement later in the year, after another election; the arrangement lasted until 2023, when the PSOE instead entered into coalition with Sumar.) The ERC’s Gabriel Rufián, who represents Barcelona in Congress, criticized both parties at the time for failing to make the needed concessions. “The left has lost its entire existence while the right smiles,” he argued.
Sánchez has also been willing to break campaign promises to stay in power. In 2024 he backed a law that exonerated those involved in Catalonia’s 2017 separatist referendum, reversing a previous position against amnesty for Catalan separatists. The deal secured him the support he needed from Junts and the ERC to remain Spain’s leader, but it also triggered mass protests.
Over the past four years Sánchez has raised the minimum wage, strengthened unemployment protections, extended paid parental leave, passed some tenant protections, restored access to abortion for sixteen- and seventeen-year-olds without parental consent, created legal gender recognition based on self-determination, and provided pathways for 600,000 undocumented migrants to achieve legal status. And yet he has not resolved some of the central problems polarizing the nation—including the fact that many people cannot afford basic goods even as business in the country booms. In 2025 Spain’s economy grew by 2.8 percent, according to an IMF estimate, outperforming Germany and other wealthy countries. Real GDP per person, on the other hand, grew by only 1.8 percent. Combined with a housing affordability crisis and rising grocery prices—Spain has the second-highest food inflation in Europe—the average person finds it increasingly hard to keep the lights on.
Many of Sánchez’s more ambitious proposals to address this problem have been blocked in Congress by Vox, the PP, and Junts. But if the right has obstructed Sánchez from alleviating the country’s economic plight, it has also wasted few opportunities to capitalize on the resulting discontent. Vox has blamed rising rent and grocery prices on government intervention, taxation, and immigration. Their recent election campaign, “inalquilable” (“unrentable”), features renters unable to navigate the housing market.
The left has fought to reclaim the issue. Last week the country’s two largest labor unions, the General Union of Workers (UGT) and the Workers’ Commissions (CCOO), organized the first general strike in fourteen years as a protest over the housing crisis. For one day, Spain ground to a halt. Afterwards Sánchez’s housing reforms finally passed Congress, but the PP has already stated that it will repeal them if it wins the election.
Another problem plaguing Sánchez has been a steady drip of corruption charges implicating PSOE officials. The Spanish Anti-Corruption Prosecutor’s Office has brought criminal charges against several prominent PSOE figures; in June Sánchez’s former Transport Minister José Luis Ábalos was sentenced to twenty-four years and three months in prison for receiving kickbacks on sales of personal protective equipment during the Covid-19 pandemic. Sánchez swiftly condemned Ábalos’s actions, claiming he had no knowledge of them.
Allegations of financial impropriety and “influence peddling” have also been levied against Sánchez’s own family members, including his wife, Begoña Gómez. In Spain a constitutional article called the “popular prosecution” allows a citizen or group to bring criminal charges, and in Gómez’s case a coalition of far-right groups—including Vox—has done precisely that, accusing her of using her position as Sánchez’s wife to obtain a post at a Madrid university and then allocating public funds to a software project. Although a Spanish prosecutor asked the judge, Juan Carlos Peinado, to drop the case, Peinado ordered Gomez to stand trial in the coming months and banned her from leaving the country. Sánchez has consistently defended Gómez, calling the charges politically motivated and at one point threatening to resign over the persecution of his family. (Charges were also brought against his brother David by the same organization for receiving a regional position overseeing public music schools; he was acquitted of influence peddling but convicted of “administrative misconduct,” a ruling he is currently appealing.)
Corruption in Spanish politics is not limited to the PSOE. Prior to Sánchez’s tenure, the PP-led government collapsed in 2018 after an enormous scandal called Caso Gürtel triggered a vote of no confidence against the prime minister at the time, Mariano Rajoy. Caso Gürtel, also occasionally called “the Spanish Watergate,” involved dozens of officials who received bribes for public contracts, including Luis Bárcenas, the former PP national treasurer, who was convicted of receiving €1.24 million. (The PP was also convicted as a civil beneficiary of the scheme.) In Transparency International’s 2025 Corruption Perceptions Index, Spain scored only 55 out of 100, and the country has even experimented with running rehab programs for crooked administrators. Nonetheless, Sánchez campaigned originally on an anti-corruption platform; the accusations and charges have damaged his ability to lead.
The PP, headed by the prime ministerial candidate Alberto Núñez Feijóo, offers a radically different vision than Sánchez’s. On November 10 the party issued a 249-point electoral manifesto that promised to largely undo many of Sánchez’s reforms and achievements over the past eight years. They would build one million new homes (rather than regulate landlords), introduce tax cuts, increase migrant deportations, introduce stricter welfare requirements, and repeal several high-profile laws. Among them is the Law of Democratic Memory, passed four years ago, which established an official Register of Victims from the years of the dictatorship, mandated the removal of Francoist symbols, and restored citizenship for the descendants of Spaniards who were exiled or forced to flee the country to save their lives. The PP officially recognizes that Franco was a dictator, but in 2021 their then-leader argued that the law would merely be a way to “dig up grudges,” a position they continue to hold.
Sánchez is right that Spain, like most former colonial European countries, has always been caught between its past and its future. Undercurrents of nostalgia for the dictatorship have ebbed and flowed over the past four decades. Today 20 percent of Spanish people continue to view Franco’s regime positively, part of a broader romanticization of fascism that has rebounded across the continent: last year a social media campaign called “Life was better under Franco” trended on TikTok.
That the historical amnesia about Franco’s cruelties has made it into both the PP’s and Vox’s policies is not surprising in a country that adopted a Pacto del Olvido (“Pact of Forgetting”) to swiftly transition to democracy without ever holding anyone accountable for the dictatorship. Even after the passage of the Law of Democratic Memory, no official has been convicted for crimes committed under Franco’s leadership, which range from torture to enforced disappearances to extrajudicial executions. Unmarked mass graves contain the bones of tens of thousands of civil war victims, while more than a hundred survivors of torture continue to seek justice.
The forces holding back Spain’s tide of resurgent right-wing politics are in some respects as embattled and divided now as they have ever been. Earlier this year the ERC’s Gabriel Rufián called for the creation of a new alliance to keep the far right from power. His proposal never advanced, shot down in part by the head of his own party. When other leftist groups—including Izquierda Unida (United Left), Movimiento Sumar, Más Madrid, and Comuns—decided to form the Frente Amplio coalition, negotiations with Podemos failed over candidate lists. Now that a tight election looms, these divisions could be especially costly. “Si no nos unimos, nos matarán por separado,” Rufián has said multiple times to the country: “If we don’t unite, they will kill us one by one.”
