Some short excerpts from the long decision by Judge Myong Joun (D. Mass.) today in0 Gino v. President & Fellows of Harvard College:
Plaintiff Francesca Gino is a former tenured professor at Harvard Business School (“HBS”) and brings this action against Defendants President and Fellows of Harvard College (“Harvard”) and Defendant Srikant Datar (“Dean Datar”). In 2021, allegations were brought against Plaintiff claiming that she committed research misconduct, which triggered an approximately 18-month long inquiry and investigation by HBS administrators and faculty. In March 2023, the investigation committee found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Plaintiff committed research misconduct…. In May 2025, Harvard revoked Plaintiff’s tenure and terminated her appointment with HBS.
Plaintiff claims that Harvard breached its obligations under various policies and procedures governing the investigation of the research misconduct allegations and the tenure revocation proceedings. Specifically, Plaintiff argues that a jury could find that Harvard deviated from its policies and procedures such that Harvard could be found in breach of those agreements, and that Harvard did not carry its burden of proving research misconduct or grave misconduct. Plaintiff also alleges that the proceedings and related findings, including the adverse employment actions taken against her, were pretext for gender discrimination….
In approximately June of 2021, three professors—Leif Nelson, Joseph Simmons, and Uri Simonsohn, who publish under the name “Data Colada”—presented their allegations against Gino to HBS Professor Max Bazerman during a 90-minute Zoom call…. [Eventually, a Harvard] Investigation Committee issued its 41-page Final Report with nearly 1,200 pages of supporting documents, finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff committed research misconduct intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly with regard to all five allegations.
The Investigation Committee’s Final Report considered and rejected Plaintiff’s contentions that unnamed “bad actors,” research assistants, or other co-authors might have instead been responsible for the data anomalies. The Investigation Committee concluded that Plaintiff’s “repeated and strenuous argument for a scenario of data falsification by bad actors across four different studies,” involving “different co-authors, different journals, different lab personnel, and different home institutions” and spanning eight years, was “highly implausible.” The Investigation Committee recommended corrections of the scientific record, putting Plaintiff on unpaid leave, and initiation of steps leading to termination of employment….
The court granted summary judgment on all these issues, in Harvard’s favor. Here’s an excerpt of the discussion of her breach of contract claims:
Massachusetts courts enforce contractual promises made by private universities, while according appropriate respect to their academic and disciplinary judgments. The Third Statute [a Harvard academic policy] permits removal of an officer holding a teaching appointment “only for grave misconduct or neglect of duty.” I hold that this is a substantive, enforceable limitation on removal, not a merely aspirational statement.
The limitation does not, however, confer a right to have a federal jury independently determine scientific authorship, data provenance, or the correct weight of forensic evidence after an academic tribunal has considered those matters. Judicial review asks whether Harvard reached its determination honestly and reasonably, upon a rational evidentiary foundation, and in compliance with its enforceable contractual procedures. This is meaningful review: the University’s decision does not prevail merely because a committee announced it.
This standard respects both the contractual restriction on removal and the institutional responsibility to adjudicate research-integrity matters. A court may not uphold a decision procured through dishonesty, resting on no reasonable evidence, or reached through a material violation of promised procedures. It also may not choose among plausible competing forensic interpretations merely because a reasonable factfinder could have drawn different scientific inferences. Gino bears the burden of proving breach in this action. The Third Statute Procedures separately placed on Harvard’s complainant a clear-and-convincing burden of establishing grave misconduct or neglect of duty; the record must be examined for whether Harvard applied that burden, not treated as though the civil burden had transferred to Harvard….
Harvard’s decision had a substantial contemporaneous evidentiary basis. The record describes forensic examination of anomalous data in four research papers; analysis of the history and characteristics of relevant datasets; consideration of Gino’s explanations; a faculty investigation finding misconduct by a preponderance of the evidence, and; a subsequent hearing committee finding, by clear and convincing evidence, of misconduct grave enough to warrant revocation. These are not independent judicial findings that Gino altered any data. They establish that Harvard investigated defined allegations and articulated an evidentiary explanation for its decision. The committees’ findings alone would not rescue a decision shown to be knowingly false or irrational; the investigative materials, considered together with the contrary submissions, provide the relevant basis for review.
Gino denies intentionally falsifying research data, relies on favorable accounts from coauthors and colleagues, and challenges aspects of the forensic inferences and evidence of access or authorship. I credit these disputes and draw permissible inferences in her favor.
But the question under the contract is not whether a jury could reject some of Harvard’s inferential steps or prefer an alternative forensic account. Gino must identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Harvard did not honestly believe its determination or lacked a rational basis to make it.
The identified differences over inference, attribution, and scientific weight do not establish that the peer decisionmakers knowingly adopted a false conclusion or acted without a reasonable evidentiary foundation. Accordingly, no triable breach arises merely from the competing interpretations of the underlying research record….
And from the court’s rejection of Gino’s sex discrimination theory:
Plaintiff points to the following pieces of evidence that she argues supports evidence of discriminatory animus: (1) Harvard deviated from and breached its policies and procedures; (2) Harvard and Dean Datar have historically subjected women to less favorable treatment; (3) Harvard has treated allegations of research misconduct against male professors differently than the allegations against Plaintiff, and; (4) certain statements made by Harvard employees were false and otherwise constitute discriminatory remarks….
Plaintiff relies on similar arguments she raised in support of her breach of contract claims that Harvard deviated from its policies with respect to investigating research misconduct. “Evidence that the employer deviated from its standard procedure or policies in taking an adverse employment action against a plaintiff may be relevant to the pretext inquiry.” As discussed, Plaintiff’s evidence does not support a finding that Harvard breached its policies. Furthermore, Plaintiff provides no evidence that any purported deviations from Harvard’s policies are connected to gender bias….
Plaintiff argues that there is evidence that Defendants have historically treated women less favorably than men. This evidence includes Plaintiff’s own testimony and testimony from Plaintiff’s colleague at HBS. Plaintiff provided testimony in a sworn declaration that she “personally observed that it was more difficult for women to obtain tenure at HBS than men. Indeed, about three times as many male professors get promoted as compared to female ones. In the Accounting & Management Unit, it’s worse: closer to four times as many.” She also stated that in 2022, she participated in an Appointment Committee meeting in which “gendered language was used to discuss the work of one female professor in the Accounting & Management Unit.” When Plaintiff raised the issue to senior colleagues, one of them told Plaintiff that it “has been that way for a while.” Plaintiff’s declaration also states that “there had not been a single tenured woman in the Accounting & Management Unit for more than 20 years.” Plaintiff’s colleague, Professor Frances Frei, also testified to evidence that Dean Datar attempted to prevent another female professor from obtaining tenure.
Plaintiff’s evidence is plainly insufficient. This evidence is made up of Plaintiff’s own conclusory allegations that it is more difficult for women to obtain tenure, a statement made by an unknown female colleague supporting Plaintiff’s belief that obtaining tenure is more difficult for women, vague allegations that unspecified “gendered language” made by unknown speakers was used when discussing an unspecified female professor, and an unsubstantiated statement from a colleague that Dean Datar attempted to “counsel out” another unspecified senior lateral hire. There are no other non-speculative facts—documents, communications, data, or otherwise—that support these conclusions or that tend to show a pattern of gender bias. Indeed, when pressed for further information about Dean Datar’s alleged “pattern” of disfavoring women, Professor Frei could not provide a response.
Further, the record does not demonstrate any other evidence of a pattern or practice of discriminatory conduct or unfavorable treatment that can be applied to reasonably infer gender bias against Plaintiff….
Plaintiff points to evidence that Harvard has treated allegations of misconduct against male professors differently than allegations against Plaintiff. Plaintiff points to two examples where male professors were treated differently…. “To successfully allege disparate treatment, a plaintiff must show that others similarly situated to her in all relevant respects were treated differently by the employer.” … Here …, there are important differences. For instance, in both the case of Mr. Serafeim and Mr. Soltes [the two examples pointed to by Plaintiff -EV], Harvard found that the complained-of conduct did not fall within the definition of research misconduct….
Additionally, the allegations against Mr. Serafeim had to do with a misleading footnote that was later admitted and explained to be an error, and the allegations against Mr. Soltes had to do with his conduct in connection with subjects that he interviewed. In contrast, the allegations against Plaintiff involved thirteen allegations of data falsification and fabrication in nine papers co-authored by Plaintiff, and after a preliminary assessment, five of those allegations were found to be sufficiently credible to fall within the definition of research misconduct. In short, it is Plaintiff’s “burden to connect the dots” between the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations against her and those of her male colleagues, such that a jury may find that they are similarly situated. Plaintiff has not met that burden here….
Plaintiff points to allegedly false statements made by Dean Datar and other Harvard leaders, as well as a gendered remark by a member of the Investigation Committee, as evidence of unlawful animus. Plaintiff alleges that the following false claims were made: (1) Dean Datar falsely claimed under oath that he did not make any “deal” with Data Colada and Data Colada’s allegations against Gino were not brought to his attention until after the Interim Policy was created; (2) Dean Datar falsely denied telling Dean Pisano that Data Colada was pressuring HBS to move the investigation along and accusing it of “whitewashing”; (3) Dean Cunningham falsely stated that she did not ask Professor Frei to counsel out Gino; (4) Professor Amabile falsely claimed under oath that, during the time of the investigation, she was not aware that the allegations brought against Gino were raised by Data Colada, and; (5) RIO Bonacossa falsely claimed under oath that he was not aware of Data Colada’s allegations against Gino at the time he was asked to serve as RIO and he did not tell Gino she could not obtain a forensic expert….
The facts presented by Plaintiff regarding the false statements do not prove that the adverse employment actions Harvard took against Plaintiff were motivated by gender bias or that the justification offered by Harvard was a sham. The allegedly false statements about what Dean Datar, Dean Cunningham, RIO Bonacossa, or Professor Amabile knew or when they knew it are not relevant to the reasons offered by Harvard that support their adverse employment decisions.
Additionally, the other fact disputes—whether Dean Datar made a deal with Data Colada and was pressured by Data Colada to move the investigation along, and whether Dean Cunningham falsely stated that she did not ask Professor Frei to counsel out Gino—are not material. The investigation that led to the adverse employment actions taken against Gino took place over nearly 18 months, involved several rounds of review by several different committees, including 26 professors, administrators, and trustees who evaluated documents, research, data, and conducted witness interviews. This investigation concluded in a 41-page report detailing the allegations, investigation process, and reasoning supporting the findings. The Third Statute Proceedings were similarly thorough and resulted in in-depth findings of fact and recommendations. Plaintiff has offered no evidence to demonstrate that Harvard’s reasoning is a sham or a pretext for gender bias.
Finally, Gino points to a committee member’s observation that she may have experienced professional and personal pressure after her husband lost his job. Although Gino characterizes the comment as reflecting an assumption about gender and family roles, I assume for purposes of the motion that it could carry such an implication. That does not end the inquiry: the remark must be assessed in context, including the speaker’s role, whether it informed a disputed factual finding, and whether the record connects it with any adverse decision because of sex. Viewed together with Gino’s other evidence, the quoted remark does not, without such a connection, establish that Harvard’s stated reasons were a pretext for sex discrimination.
Considering the evidence cumulatively rather than in isolated categories, Gino identifies criticism of the procedures, comments concerning women’s advancement, two male faculty members accused of different forms of impropriety, challenged statements by institutional actors, and the committee member’s remark. The asserted procedural irregularities do not, without a supported causal connection, compel or permit a reasonable finding that the decisionmakers acted because of her sex. The comparator matters identified above concern materially different charges and screening decisions.
Even assuming that Gino meets the modest prima facie threshold and that some administrative statements are disputed, the total record cited does not raise a genuine dispute that Harvard’s articulated research-misconduct basis was a cover for sex discrimination under federal law. Count I’s selective-enforcement theory separately fails because the identified male comparators do not demonstrate selective pursuit of comparable allegations on the basis of sex. The Title VII and Title IX claims are against the institution insofar as authorized by the respective statutes; any individual liability asserted against Dean Datar must be evaluated under the applicable state-law provision rather than presumed from the federal employment claims….
Douglas E. Brayley, Jenny K. Cooper, Elena W. Davis, Stephanie D. Porges, and Laura G. Hoey (Ropes & Gray LLP) represent defendants.