The first talks were between Iran and Oman, then between Oman and Qatar, followed by Iran and Saudi Arabia, and finally, Qatar and Saudi Arabia – all aimed at hammering out what regional co-existence would look like once the war dust settled.

Such dizzying diplomatic activity is just getting started, with more meetings expected, as Gulf nations calibrate a new normal with Iran.

Discussions have covered how traffic through the Strait of Hormuz will be managed and what financial incentives the Gulf might provide Iran in exchange for possible security concessions.

It is happening alongside – albeit separately from – ongoing negotiations between the US and Iran to hammer out a longer-term peace deal by a late August deadline.

“US credibility has declined considerably, and that’s been going on now for many years,” said Gonul Tol, a senior fellow at the Middle East Institute. The thinking is that “we just have to reach our own understanding with Iran – it wouldn’t be surprising if Gulf countries actually cut their own deal”.

For now, the public messaging has been consistent with the US. A joint statement following a recent ministerial meeting of a regional alliance – attended by Marco Rubio, the US secretary of state – emphasised the importance of “free, unconditional and unrestricted navigation” and rejected “any tolls, fees, or attempts to assert control over the strait”.

“It’s going to be a red line from their point of view,” said Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi of Chatham House.

But Gulf diplomats and experts have also highlighted that they believed Iran would not simply let go of what it regards as its ultimate trump card, and that they need to be realistic regarding potential outcomes.

The Telegraph understands that there are ongoing ideas floated for a possible scheme in which “service fees” will be collected, ostensibly to cover the costs of demining the strait, mitigate environmental degradation, port charges or for insurance purposes.

It is unclear which organisation would host the mechanism, how funds would be collected, and to whom final disbursement would be received.

Iran has already started moving in this direction, issuing through its newly created Gulf Strait Authority a requirement for vessels to have Iranian insurance. That is meant to take effect after the 60-day window expires, during which Tehran and Washington aim to come to a longer-term agreement.

“Iran has now realised that it has a more effective weapon than a nuclear one – Hormuz – that they can use anytime, so there will be some kind of arrangement where Iran will continue to call the shots,” said Ms Tol. “They will do everything to keep that leverage.”

No amount of dressing up the fees will appease Donald Trump, the US president, who has repeatedly said no charges would be allowed. Experts also worry that this would set a dangerous precedent, though under an international maritime treaty that bans transit fees, charges may be levied for “specific services rendered to the ship”.

But the Gulf states may have little choice. Iran’s feared Revolutionary Guards threatened vessels in the strait last week after the UN, Iran and Oman agreed on two routes to allow stranded vessels to evacuate.

Iran insisted that it was the sole authority for designated routes, warning that “vessel traffic outside these routes is prohibited and highly dangerous”.

The next day, a Taiwanese shipping operator said its vessel was hit in the strait by what US officials said was an Iranian drone, the first such attack since the US and Iran signed an interim ceasefire deal.

Washington and Tehran then traded retaliatory attacks that spread to the Gulf states. The two sides have since agreed to halt further strikes before talks in Qatar on Tuesday.

These Iranian threats and attacks “likely serve as an implicit warning to Gulf countries – particularly Oman … that Iran will continue to attack international shipping if they do not co-operate with Iran”, according to a report by the Soufan Center, a US-based non-profit research organisation.

Even without these attacks, “Gulf countries were already preparing themselves for a situation where things might not come back as usual”, said Yasmine Farouk, who leads research on Arab Gulf countries at the International Crisis Group, a non-profit think tank. “They’re going to take matters into their own hands, in the regional tracks of discussion.”

Saudi Arabia is expected to lead on broader talks over regional security, with nations arranging direct, individual meetings with Iran regarding the management of Hormuz. Yet another grouping could include Iraq, which is economically dependent on oil exports through the strait.

The main leverage that the Gulf nations have is financial – the ability to invest in Iran, whose economy is in dire straits, both from sanctions and the impact of war.

“They feel this is Iran’s Achilles’ heel once the war ends,” said Ms Farouk.

But they will seek concessions from Iran to reduce the threats they face just across the water. That could mean limiting the number of missiles that Iran is allowed to have, or curbing the regime’s efforts to arm its proxy groups, which also launched attacks against Gulf states in this war.

The numerous separate meetings ongoing within the Gulf – and alongside broader Tehran-Washington negotiations – underlines the region’s departure from relying primarily on the US.

“America will remain the backbone of their defence structure and of their defence systems,” said Ms Farouk. “The US has had, for a long time, a monopoly over defence relations and arms procurement over the Gulf. Whatever America doesn’t have or can’t be procured fast enough – or if the US doesn’t have something to deal with the Iranian threat – they are going to look for it elsewhere.”

Diversification is already happening. In May, Kuwait established a defence procurement framework with Turkey to buy drones and air defence systems. Ukraine, too, has recently signed deals to export drones to Saudi Arabia, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

The Gulf states are looking further afield, with Saudi Arabia holding several meetings in a new “quad” with Egypt, Pakistan and Turkey.

Confidence in the US has been waning ever since Mr Trump’s first administration, particularly after he pulled out of an Iran nuclear deal in 2018, as a result of which Tehran gradually ceased complying with restrictions on its nuclear programme.

Then, in Mr Trump’s current term, his decisions to go to war with Iran twice – and threats to pull out of Nato – have worried many countries that even commitments on paper from Washington may not amount to much of a guarantee.

But they’ll probably still push for a way to restore confidence, perhaps along the lines of the 2025 executive order Mr Trump signed “assuring the security of the state of Qatar”.

Still, Gulf nations are realising “we have to do things based on the assumption that the US is not going to be there, and even if it is there, it can do things that will undermine us”, said Ms Tol.

And despite all the diplomatic overtures made towards Iran over the years – including the UAE turning a blind eye to the regime moving sanctioned funds through Dubai, an international financial hub – they will remain a target.

That is perhaps even more of a concern with a new, more radical Iranian regime. Past regimes, for instance, never shut down Hormuz when they could have weaponised control of the strait.

Given that, the Gulf states are not going to ask the US military to leave the region outright, though they remain disappointed over broken promises.

But they will “supplement their strategies by having plan B and plan C, in case the US does not follow through on its security guarantees and defence promises”, said Ms Farouk.