Lifestyle

Should We Ban Brain-Boosting Tech to Protect the Poor?

Should We Ban Brain-Boosting Tech to Protect the Poor?

Recognizing the variety of dystopian science-fiction novels and movies, from Brave New World to Gattaca and, more recently, Star Trek, on the future of humanity in which eugenic policies are implemented, genetic engineering has been getting a bad reputation for valid but, arguably, mostly historical reasons. The same objections are used against technological enhancement of our brains (e.g., computer chips or via drugs). This is why I’ve published an academic article on the topic.

In this post, I critically examine the claim from Maxwell J. Mehlman and Jeffrey R. Botkin that human enhancement will inevitably accentuate existing inequality in a free market and analyze whether prohibition is the optimal public policy for this objection, as egalitarians might advise. Of course, various moral theories will evaluate this claim, which I shall call the inequality-objection, differently. Yet, for the purposes of the present post, I shall only consider whether the inequality-objection is a problem to the dominant moral framework in policy-making (i.e., utilitarianism).

What Is at Stake?

Though perhaps having raised the largest concerns in the public perception of human enhancement, the inequality-objection is neither a very sophisticated argument nor a very new one, against the introduction of new technologies that could enhance humans beyond what might be considered “normal.” In fact, the whole argument is old wine in new bottles. Concerning inequality, Bostrom and Roache claim that one could hold the justified worry that:

People with radically enhanced cognitive capacities might gain vast advantages in terms of income, strategic planning, and the ability to influence others; in other words, an enhanced cognitive elite may gain socially significant amounts of power.

Of course, it seems undesirable if an enhanced elite accumulates a lot of power, but whether this is even a plausible scenario is an open question. From a utilitarian perspective, the inequality-objection can be fleshed out as follows:

  • P1: Human enhancement leads to inequality.
  • P2: Inequality leads to a decrease in well-being.
  • P3: What leads to a decrease in well-being should be prohibited by policy-makers.
  • C: Therefore, human enhancement should be prohibited by policy-makers.

Human Enhancement Leads to Inequality?

Let me begin with the premise that human enhancement will increase inequality. This premise is empirical in nature and, as such, requires supporting evidence. More specifically, there are reasons to believe that human enhancement will not affect inequality at all, or even decrease it, as Bostrom and Roache suggest, by making people “more equal,” as is the case with modafinil. Bostrom suggests that we know far more about genes responsible for inheritable diseases than genes responsible for talents, intelligence, and longevity; hence, human enhancement might especially help the genetically worst-off in society.

This means that some enhancements, like an increase in cognitive capacities, might enable agents to become better competitors. Considering this, it seems unlikely that people wouldn’t consider taking loans for enhancing themselves, in order to increase their expected wage. Banks might even give loans for human enhancement in a similar fashion to education loans. Instead of paying for advanced training courses, employers might consider paying for cognitive enhancements of their employees.

Inequality Leads to a Decrease in Well-being?

According to egalitarians, everyone should be equal. Utilitarians, of course, are not concerned with these kinds of egalitarian theories, but rather the maximization of well-being. Several reasons could come to mind: potential oppression, discrimination, unfairness, exploitation, envy, or simply a preference for equality. Even if we grant that these are worrisome consequences of human enhancement, in the utilitarian framework, we would still have to weigh the benefits against these costs. While we may grant that human enhancement might decrease well-being by introducing inequality, there are other areas where human enhancement can potentially increase well-being enormously.

Prohibition of Human Enhancement, the Best Solution?

I argue that it is wrong to think that we have the choice between status quo and a world where human enhancement takes place. Applied to human enhancement, this means that a world where it is illegal does not equal a world where this technology is not available. Anders Sandberg and Nick Bostrom claim that a prohibition will be an incentive for the creation of black markets, which, as with drugs, may tend to make these technologies even more expensive, while legal enhancements would become less risky and less expensive as time goes on. Mehlman and Botkin raise the question of how those breaking the law should be punished—for instance, will someone with genetic enhancements be forced to alter his DNA back to the point it was before or have to be sterilized? Will people who would have died without enhancements have to be sentenced to death by revoking their enhancements?

In short, there are several reasons speaking against prohibition and some that speak in favour of other solutions. For instance, Bostrom proposes subsidies or free access for children of poor families.

Conclusion

There seem to be at least three major problems with the inequality-objection. First, there is no empirical evidence that human enhancement will lead to inequality. Second, even if we accept that human enhancement will lead to inequality, it is not clear whether this will outweigh the potential benefits of human enhancement. Third, even if it does, prohibition is not necessarily the best policy for maximizing well-being. In light of these concerns, I conclude that even if human enhancement leads to inequality, this is not sufficient to conclude that human enhancement should be prohibited by policy-makers.

A version of this post also appears on my Substack.



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