Philosophy

The origins of the state are not agrarian but pastoralist

The origins of the state are not agrarian but pastoralist


Transportation is the backbone of civilisation, which is why controlling the Strait of Hormuz grants global leverage. Because oil fuels more than 90 per cent of global transit, the source of this power lies not in the waterway, but in the control of global mobility. Halting all oil supplies paralyses virtually all transport, communication and supply lines: cities collapse, states disintegrate, societies break down and populations die off, throwing humanity back to the pre-industrial age. Without transport animals, humanity would still be back in the Stone Age.

No city or state can exist without transportation, for there can be no concentration of population and resources. No transportation means no extrahuman transportation, leaving walking and carrying as the only means of transit. This baseline determined the size and structure of human communities. Production was limited to what could be carried home, circumscribing the areas where humans could settle and colonise. Production capacity and resource availability kept communities small, forcing them to split and disperse. Because size dictates structure, small meant undifferentiated and egalitarian. Ultimately, the inherent limit of the physical capability of travel and portage formed a natural immunity to inequality: it kept communities small, egalitarian and autonomous, leaving their lands beyond conquest.

As long as this constraint existed, communities resembled those of the Amazon Basin or the New Guinea Highlands. The domestication of animals and the invention of boats liberated humanity, making long-distance mobilisation possible. With this newfound capacity, communities no longer needed to fit their immediate environments; instead, they could build cities and integrate expansive areas – all roads lead to Rome. Transportation – not grain – is what brought the state and civilisation into existence, and what continues to maintain them. Let’s examine this power by looking from the present back to the origin of the state.

Whoever rules the waves rules the world! Without its navy and air force, the United States cannot command global reach or project power worldwide. The same was true of European colonial empires; ultimately, warships and gunboats forged them. In earlier periods, Vikings built their empire on longships, Aztecs on canoes, Egyptians on riverboats, and Romans, Greeks and Phoenicians on galleys.

Conquering the world on horseback is easy, as the saying goes. On land, equids – donkeys and horses – forged states and civilisations, while the llama did the same for the Inkas. Ur’s kunga chariots project the military might of Mesopotamian cities, and the Abydos donkeys demonstrate their vital role in early Egyptian kingship. By the end of the 3rd millennium BCE, Central Eurasian nomads were entombing entire horse chariots – the high-tech, high-value war machines of their time – to honour their kings in Sintashta. Horse chariots later symbolised the power of the Shang and the Zhou; the latter deployed 4,000 chariots to overwhelm the former in 1046 BCE.

Building a state does not require grain, but does demand extrahuman transportation

‘The rider appears on the stage of history like a new breed of man’ – a centaur, as the German sociologist Alexander Rüstow put it in the 1950s. Eurasian nomads had long bred their mounts into the modern domestic horse, paving the way for an age of empires that would fundamentally reshape the world. Horses dominated human history for nearly four millennia. Even for maritime powers, horses remained key to conquest; from Carthage to the British, all relied on horses for inland expansion. Francisco Pizarro’s conquest of the Inkas is a prime illustration of the power of horses against an essentially pedestrian empire built on llama transportation. Horses also enabled the Comanche in North America to forge their empire and compete with European powers for nearly a century.

The Comanche Empire? Did they actually have grain to build a state? No, they had no grain – nor any agriculture, for that matter. Horse husbandry and bison hunting sustained their livelihood. In fact, all the Eurasian steppe powers – including the Mongols – relied on pastoralism. What they enjoyed most was an abundance of extrahuman transportation; what they lacked most was agricultural produce. Ultimately, building a state does not require grain, but it does demand extrahuman transportation.

Look at the political geography of the Roman and Mongol empires: the Romans could reach where ships could reach, and the Mongols could reach where horses could reach. The same is true of European colonial empires; it all comes down to the power of extrahuman transportation. Donkeys, horses and all other herd animals are the creations of pastoralists. Extrahuman transportation made the state and civilisation possible; this places pastoralism at the origin of the state and civilisation, and the Eurasian steppe at the centre of human history.

Animated map depicting the expansion of the Mongol Empire from 1206 to 1294, marked with red that spreads from Mongolia to reach as far as Eastern Europe in the west and China in the east.

The expansion of the Mongol Empire in the 13th century. Courtesy Wikipedia

Yet the Sinocentric paradigm – the predominant vision of human history and civilisation with China at its centre – structurally erases extrahuman transportation and, with it, pastoralism, steppe empires and charisma from state formation, thereby negating the Eurasian steppe as the prime centre of human history. This framework shapes our current understanding of world history, leaving us with a view defined by entrapment, doom and despair. Becoming aware of this paradigm is essential if we are to break free from this bleak outlook, better comprehend the world we live in, and chart a brighter future.

While scholars critique world history for its Eurocentric bias, its conceptual framework and narrative are profoundly Sinocentric. This is because the origin of the state – and consequently the birth of civilisation – is the question that shapes our vision of world history. The latest authoritative iteration of this view is James C Scott’s Against the Grain: A Deep History of the Earliest States (2017), along with his The Art of Not Being Governed (2009). ‘The Origin of the State: Land Productivity or Appropriability’ by Joram Mayshar and colleagues is its economic restatement. Scott, readers might counter, focuses almost exclusively on Mesopotamia and rarely mentions China. Yet his underlying framework actually rearticulates the paradigm established by the American Orientalist Owen Lattimore’s influential work, Inner Asian Frontiers of China (1940). Precisely for this reason, Scott not only frequently mentions ‘the loess soils along the Yellow River’, but also, directly quoting Lattimore, claims that ‘irrigation was spectacularly rewarding in the loess core of ancient China’.

Antique map of China and Mongolia with coloured borders and detailed geographic features.

A 1925 map of China and Mongolia by the George F Cram company, Chicago. Courtesy the David Rumsey Map Collection

Lattimore sought to legitimise the Republic of China’s claims over Mongolia, Manchukuo, Tibet and Eastern Turkestan. To this end, he advanced the grain thesis to locate the origins of statehood and civilisation in the Yellow River Valley, positioning China as the Cradle of the East. By mapping Frederick Jackson Turner’s American frontier thesis onto the region, Lattimore framed China as the civilised centre and reduced the aforementioned territories to ‘Inner Asia’ – a mere geohistorical frontier akin to the American West. In doing so, Lattimore abandoned the traditional conquest theory – a framework he had previously espoused – which held that both China’s early states and most of its subsequent empires were forged by Eurasian nomadic conquerors rather than indigenous dynamics. The rejection of the conquest theory was a repudiation of extrahuman transportation and pastoralism as forces that led to statehood, and an exaltation of sedentism and grain agriculture instead.

The paradigm owes its formation to Cold War politics and is at odds with archaeological evidence

The theory that entrenched Lattimore’s thesis in academia is Robert Carneiro’s circumscription hypothesis, published in the journal Science as ‘A Theory of the Origin of the State’ (1970). Not just conventional narratives, but a wide array of prominent thinkers – including Michael Mann, Jared Diamond, Francis Fukuyama and Yuval Noah Harari – popularised Carneiro’s theory in different guises. Even David Graeber and David Wengrow ultimately remain within this framework.

Drawing on Carneiro’s concept of circumscribed agricultural land, Mann’s The Sources of Social Power (1986) posits ecological and social cages with no ‘escape route’, while Diamond’s Guns, Germs, and Steel (1997) similarly focuses on regions with ‘nowhere to flee’ to isolate the environmental conditions that generate the population pressure needed for the rise of the state. Fukuyama’s The Origins of Political Order (2011), however, is far more direct in delineating the primary conditions for pristine state formation: ‘that population needs to be physically constrained so that it increases in density’ and ‘that subjects cannot run away when coerced’. When Diamond wrote in Nature in 2002 that agricultural storable food surpluses ‘led to social stratification, political centralisation and standing armies’, he was merely rationalising the Lattimore-Carneiro population-pressure dogma as an ‘autocatalytic’ process. Harari’s Sapiens (2011), with its disease-ridden ‘luxury trap’, Scott’s The Art of Not Being Governed, along with his Against the Grain, and Graeber and Wengrow’s lamentation that ours is a species ‘enslaved to its crops’ all ultimately stem from the same grain thesis.

Indeed, the Lattimore-Carneiro framework relied on a population-pressure model, arguing that agriculture and sedentism triggered overpopulation, forcing the creation of hierarchies and states. However, Carneiro’s circumscription thesis required areas such as Mesopotamia, the Nile Valley and the Peruvian coast to be entirely overcrowded. Instead, empirical settlement surveys revealed that these areas lacked the demographic density to exhaust arable land, with some even experiencing depopulation during early state-formation. Because no population pressure existed to catalyse state formation, archaeological findings invalidated Carneiro’s theory.

Scott’s novelty lies neither in his rhetoric of ‘political crops’, nor in his laser-focused ‘circumscribed ecological niches’ of ‘alluvial or loess soils’, but rather in his theoretical sleight of hand: dynamic climatic circumscription. His fertile alluvial or loess soils mirror Carneiro’s circumscribed agricultural land, though on a minuscule scale, engineered by a millennium-long drought rather than geographic barriers. Ultimately, Scott repurposes Carneiro’s model of resource concentration – a resource-rich habitat that draws people from surrounding regions – yet he supercharges it with the driving force of drought. In sum, drought – simultaneously reconfiguring the physical terrain into a localised cage and driving populations inward – enables Scott to isolate the minuscule, 250-hectare footprint of Uruk as the circumscribed agricultural land. Scott’s model here is a clever manoeuvre to salvage the Sinocentric paradigm. That paradigm, as we shall see, owes its formation to Cold War politics and is at odds with archaeological evidence.

Whether climatic or geographical, the agricultural cage is inherently an anti-mobility framing that structurally erases pastoralism from the formation of the state. This erasure is, however, not just a conceptual flaw; it is written into the paradigm’s DNA, as the framework is fundamentally built against mobility, and actively argues for its exclusion. The erasure takes the form of epistemic theft by way of attributing the authorship of domestication of livestock and pastoralism to farmers, delaying the date of the advent of pastoralism through hyper-restrictive definitions, and relying on exclusionary framing. While the initial framework was a politically motivated, instrumental scheme, subsequent models have resulted from paradigmatic biases.

The question that led to this erasive framing was not the origin of the state in general, but its emergence in what is now China – specifically, whether it was indigenous or born of nomadic conquest. This issue was linked to a raging political dilemma: did Manchuria, and by extension the Daiching Empire (also known as the Qing dynasty), constitute a Chinese or an Inner Asian empire? This debate was a political question concerning the definition of China and the delineation of its territory. Specifically, should China be defined as ‘China proper’, restricted to the Ming provinces, or as ‘China imperial’, encompassing the domains of the Daiching Empire.

The controversy escalated into a heightened political crisis with the declaration of Manchukuo. Japanese scholarship argued that the Daiching Empire was an Inner Asian state that had conquered China, and that the Manchus were a distinct people deserving independence. The Chinese nationalist regime and its scholarship countered, arguing that the empire was inherently Chinese, and that Manchuria had been an integral part of China since antiquity. Meanwhile, contemporary critical scholarship essentially agreed with the Japanese view; the dominant framework for the origins of the state in China was the invasion theory, which argued that early Chinese states, as well as many subsequent empires, were forged by Eurasian nomadic conquerors. Crucially, until then, Lattimore himself had been a proponent of this theory.

Two people in red robes sitting on a grassy hill overlooking a vast landscape with distant mountains.

Monks on White Hill overlooking Urga (now Ulaanbaatar), Mongolia, in 1913. Courtesy the Musée Albert-Kahn, France

Hand-coloured photo of a man in traditional Mongolian attire on a horse beside a river in a grassy landscape with distant hills.

A rider beside a river near Urga. Courtesy the Musée Albert-Kahn, France

The Republic of China was a legal fiction enabled by the Open Door policy (authored by US diplomats in 1899). Yet, this very regime claimed sovereignty over Mongolia, Manchuria, Eastern Turkestan and Tibet. By the 1930s, however, the Open Door order was in tatters: Outer Mongolia had declared independence in 1911, Tibet in 1912, and Manchukuo had broken away in 1932, absorbing Eastern Inner Mongolia. The rest of Inner Mongolia was ruled by a Japanese-allied government, while Eastern Turkestan declared independence in 1933.

Had Mongolia and the others remained states, they could not have been conceptualised as frontiers, but rather as independent neighbours

Recognising the Daiching Empire as an Inner Asian state meant forfeiting China’s claim over all of these regions, stripping the regime of what Lattimore estimated at nearly two-thirds of its claimed territory. Worse still for the West, the Soviet Union was poised to become the ultimate beneficiary – an outcome the regime and its primary architect, the US, were determined to prevent. The regime had to ensure that its territory emerged as inherently Chinese, and scholarship was needed to substantiate this claim. This required refuting the invasion theory and reframing China as the Cradle of the East. Lattimore’s book, Inner Asian Frontiers of China, accomplished precisely this.

Executing a complete about-face from his earlier position, building on Chinese nationalist scholarship, and drawing on Turner’s American frontier thesis, Lattimore reframed Mongolia, Manchuria, Chinese Turkistan (today’s Xinjiang) and Tibet as the frontiers of China. Reducing these territories to a mere geographic area – Inner Asia – and rebranding them as mere frontiers required rendering the region stateless, tribal and barbarian. Had Mongolia and the others remained states, they could not have been conceptualised as frontiers, but rather as independent neighbours; his framework thus demanded a terra nullius.

Refuting the invasion theory required disarming it of its most potent weapon of conquest – mobility – and supplanting it with an alternative framework. Lattimore accomplished this by casting mobility as an anti-state force, substituting the invasion thesis with evolutionary materialism. Inverting his earlier argument that mobility provided a ‘snowball’ effect to Mongol political organisation, Lattimore was the first to equate mobility with dispersal. He thereby transformed what was previously understood as the ultimate mobilising and concentrating mechanism into an inherently dispersive element. This reframing neutralised conquest theory, turning its defining weapon into an anti-state force.

Furthermore, by establishing mobility as the defining feature of pastoralism, and immobility as that of irrigated agriculture, Lattimore posited both a positive correlation between wealth and power and a negative one between mobility and wealth/power, thus advancing his ‘wealth versus mobility’ thesis. And by asserting that ‘grain, accumulated and stored, was beyond question the standard of real wealth in essentials’, he guaranteed ‘the ascendancy of wealth over mobility’. In this manner, Lattimore not only erased mobility as the state-making force but also established grain as that very force. In fact, Lattimore is the author of the grain thesis, and in his framework, the state emerges as a grain store.

Mobility, thus, emerged not merely as dispersal, but as a mechanism of destitution, rather than a driver of state-building. While Lattimore declared that ‘it is the poor nomad who is pure nomad,’ intellectual successors like the cultural anthropologist Marshall Sahlins observed that a nomad’s wealth ‘is a burden’ that ‘soon poses a contradiction to his mobility.’ Anatoly Khazanov pushed this thesis further, arguing that pastoralism is inherently non-self-sufficient (non-autarkic) or even anti-autarkic, thereby rendering it fundamentally incapable of producing a state.

At the same time, by mapping environmentally determined societies – specifically, forest-hunting clans, steppe-pastoral tribes, and loess-agricultural states – and adding extensive and intensive dimensions, Lattimore established population pressure as the primary catalyst for state-formation. While agriculture in general emerged as uniquely capable of generating a state, irrigated agriculture was intensive enough to trigger severe demographic strain. Identifying a continuous agricultural expanse enclosed by ‘an immense mass of inhospitable terrain’ – namely, ‘the bleak highlands’ and ‘the Inner Asian barrier lands’ on one side, and the Pacific Ocean on the other – Lattimore mapped China as a circumscribed agricultural land.

To cast China as the Cradle of the East and claim Inner Asia as a Chinese frontier, Lattimore framed Inner Asian pastoralism as a byproduct of agricultural expansion, attributing all historical agency to farmers. By claiming pastoralists were ‘akin by culture and probably by blood to the early Chinese’, he cast both populations as homologous. Dating steppe pastoralism to the 4th century BCE – as an offshoot of intensive Chinese agriculture – allowed Lattimore to monopolise the state-formation timeline and neutralise the invasion theory.

To stall the timeline of pastoralism’s emergence, he devised a hyper-restrictive definition: dismissing categories like ‘true’, ‘strict’ or ‘normal’ as overly broad, he defined ‘pastoral nomadism’ exclusively as ‘the extreme of nomadism’ or ‘the strict or extreme phases of steppe nomadism’. This framework equates pastoralism with the advent of horseback riding and, in effect, with the rise of cavalry.

To be sure, all of these claims conflicted with contemporary scholarly knowledge, including archaeology and linguistics. Back then, archaeology had shown that horse-riding nomadism and animal art emerged around 1500 BCE in the Black Sea region before spreading eastward through Mongolia to Ordos – a fact Lattimore was aware of. Similarly, linguists such as Henri Maspero had shown that the Chinese language ‘has no relation whatever, not even a distant connection with’ Turkic, Mongolic and Tungusic languages. Nonetheless, Lattimore’s attribution of pastoral animal domestication to farmers and his hyper-restrictive definition of pastoralism became paradigmatic in the field. Khazanov cemented Lattimore’s thesis: he claimed that only sedentary groups with definite vegetable surpluses could domesticate animals, and characterised ‘pure pastoral nomadism’ as ‘the most extreme form’ of nomadism. In this manner, mobility and pastoralism were written out of the state-formation process.

Vintage photo of a Mongolian landscape with yurts, mountains in the background and a person standing in the foreground.

An encampment in Inner Mongolia, 1912. Courtesy the Musée Albert-Kahn, France

People in traditional clothing standing in front of yurts in a grassy landscape, historical setting.

However, modern scholarship by Melinda Zeder shows that ‘plant and animal domestication occurred at roughly the same time, with signs of initial management … reaching back to at least 11,500 cal BP [ie, 9550 BCE], if not earlier.’ Furthermore, we now know that early animal domestication ‘only took place within a subset of the geographical distribution of the wild ancestors’, unfolding ‘often in regions distant from centres of plant domestication.’ Critically, while most herd animals were domesticated via the prey pathway rather than a commensal one, pastoralists domesticated equids – donkeys and horses – via a directed pathway. Yet, by claiming that ‘specialised pastoralism, seen as an outgrowth of agriculture’ confronts the state with a ‘problem of dispersal and mobility’, Scott continues to perpetuate Lattimore’s delayed timeline and restrictive definition – even while acknowledging that agriculture and pastoralism emerged concurrently roughly 12,000 years ago.

Mobility, pastoralism and tribalism were essentially conflated

By the 1970s, Lattimore’s framework had become the dominant orthodoxy. Elman Service, a leading neo-evolutionist, hailed it as ‘the pathfinding ecological theory’, while Morton Fried acknowledged that Lattimore ‘proposed a theory that stimulated my own’. Ultimately, neo-evolutionism displaced conquest theory as the mainstream paradigm. By positioning intensive agriculture as the sole economic foundation capable of sustaining the state, Fried’s social stratification scheme (egalitarian, rank, stratified, and state) and Service’s sociopolitical typology (band, tribe, chiefdom, and state) reinforced Lattimore’s irrigated agriculture thesis while anchoring evolutionary materialism. Consequently, the state – either as an instrument of the upper class or as a managerial institution – emerges fundamentally as an economic instrument and an evolutionary product.

By deriving the state from either social or functional differentiation, both Fried and Service rejected conquest theory. Whereas Service’s model is basically a refinement of 19th-century bourgeois materialism, Fried’s framework aligns with the Marxist model by emphasising conflict driven by internal economic differentiation. Carneiro likewise rejected conquest theory; despite his incorporating warfare and coercion, his model remains an elaboration of Fried’s framework. As one of the most influential models of neo-evolutionary thought, Carneiro’s framework was a direct product of this paradigmatic bias, and it effectively resulted in the global scaling of Lattimore’s framework. China was established as the Cradle of the East, while Inner Asia was relegated to a tribal world and ‘the barbarian “outer darkness”’. Mobility, pastoralism and tribalism were essentially conflated until Caroline Humphrey and David Sneath deconstructed the category of ‘nomadism’ and the myth of the wandering nomad in 1999, paving the way for Sneath to later debunk the tribal model as a complete misrepresentation. Meanwhile, in a corpus of historical scholarship utilising primary sources, Christopher P Atwood compellingly demonstrates that the tribal model is untenable.

However, Scott not only resurrects Lattimore’s framework in its entirety along with its long-refuted theories but also repackages it to fit his own anarchist project. Following Lattimore, Scott maintains that Inner Asian pastoralism – along with its population – was merely a byproduct of Chinese agricultural expansion. His assertion that the Great Wall was built as much to contain Chinese taxpayers as to repel external invasions likewise mirrors Lattimore’s position. Scott’s most spectacular move is his elevation of mobility into a primary form of freedom. Lattimore’s notion of free nomads – with their ‘idea of freedom, free movement, free migration’ – nicely dovetailed with Scott’s anarchist thesis, prompting him to valorise mobility as a freedom-preserving force and recast it as the fundamental state-preventing strategy.

This conceptualisation clearly finds its echo in The Dawn of Everything (2021), where Graeber and Wengrow theorise ‘the freedom to move’ as one of the ‘fundamental, even primary, forms of freedom’. At the same time, Scott’s grain thesis, in particular, and agricultural paradigm, in general, powerfully guide our thinking, leading the two authors to declare in despair that ‘we got stuck’ and that ‘ours is a species that has become enslaved to its crops.’ Mobility thus emerged as a fundamentally anti-state, anti-domination and freedom-preserving force, albeit one that proved impotent against the all-powerful grain to which we, along with all our extrahuman transportation, are enslaved. This is how the Sinocentric paradigm was devised and how it erases pastoralism from state-formation. The objective of this paradigm is to eliminate mobility, and its theoretical frameworks inherently structure scholarly thinking and enquiry against pastoralism. Ultimately, this is how the Sinocentric paradigm traps us intellectually.

With the erasure of mobility and pastoralism and the relegation of Inner Asia into tribal barbarity, the Sinocentric paradigm monopolised state-formation in China for the Chinese while establishing China as the sole empire and civilisation within the former Daiching domain. However, there were Inner Asian empires – especially the Daiching Empire – on whose identification the integrity of the regime’s claim over Inner Asia depended. This demanded their total erasure. The method – as Lattimore himself observed in 1934 while depicting the grim reality that the Open Door policy had imposed upon the Mongols, the Manchus, the Uighurs and the Tibetans – was to ‘deny their history and surrender their national and racial identities’ and, ultimately, to conquer them conceptually. Notably, this is the exact policy that the current Chinese administration pursues today.

This meant the appropriation of all the empires that conquered China as inherently Chinese, and the construction of an everlasting Chinese empire. To achieve this, two problems had to be solved: the reality of conquests and the distinct identity of the conquering empires. Because these conquests were not isolated incidents but occurred in overwhelming numbers, a sophisticated framework had to be devised.

To appropriate Inner Asian empires, Lattimore devised the theory of Chinese dynastic cycles, a teleological device that powerfully legitimises Chinese nationalist claims through a veneer of deterministic, historical law. By reducing all empires to mere dynasties, this cycle creates the illusion of an enduring Chinese state where successive dynasties simply replace one another. Conquests are thus erased as mere changes in ruling houses while the empire itself remains intact. Consequently, the Chinese empire emerges as uniquely endless – an everlasting polity standing in stark contrast to the mortal trajectories of all other historical powers, including the Roman Empire.

To make this everlasting empire inherently Chinese and to deny the identity of the conquering empires – in contrast to British ‘accumulative’ and Russian ‘incorporative’ models – Lattimore forged ‘the third great type’: the Chinese ‘absorptive’ empire. Unlike ‘conquest’ empires, this was a ‘defensive empire’ – one that did not conquer but was conquered, yet remained Chinese by absorbing its conquerors. Consequently, the polity emerged not as a conquering political power, but as a cultural community predicated on assimilation. Furthermore, as China was established as civilisation itself, and Inner Asia was reduced to barbarity, all Inner Asian conquests represented a barbarian advancement toward civilisation. Sinicisation was a ‘standing offer of the opportunity to become civilised, to any individual or group interested in progress’ – the civilising mission.

China was reified as an everlasting empire, and its history emerged as unbroken dynastic cycles

However, Lattimore’s highly idiosyncratic conceptualisations invert reality. Empire, by definition, is an expansionist, incorporative polity; what defines an empire is expansion, and what drives it is conquest. It is also anything but culturally homogeneous; its very nature is all-encompassing, hierarchical and heterogeneous. Thus, Lattimore’s Chinese absorptive empire is a veritable anomaly. Moreover, with hundreds of mutually unintelligible varieties divided across at least eight major language groups, even the Sinitic group – let alone China as a whole – represents immense cultural diversity.

In fact, Lattimore’s ‘absorptive’ empire was the political embodiment of the Chinese nationalist narrative of assimilative power, depicting China as a solid, homogenising mass, ‘homogeneous in race, language, and culture’, where the ‘barbarians were all absorbed by the Chinese; they became Chinese like any other Chinese.’ Hence, the Manchus were all assimilated by the Chinese and became Chinese like any other; therefore, the Manchu empire was a Chinese dynasty like any other. Had all the Mongols shared the Manchu fate, the Chinese empire would have been the largest contiguous land empire the world had ever seen; then, what June Teufel Dreyer called the ‘tianxia trope’ – the idea that a Sinocentric world is the better one – would have possessed a formidable precedent.

Antique map of Asia, highlighting territories, countries and borders with text labels, published in 1914.

A 1914 map of Asia depicting China as a ‘solid, homogenising mass’. Courtesy Wikipedia

Nevertheless, Lattimore’s framework immediately became hegemonic. China was reified as an everlasting empire, and its history emerged as unbroken dynastic cycles with a predictable Sinicisation pattern. Paired with the Chinese world order, the paradigm crystallised into unchallenged dogma. Lattimore emerged ‘as the intellectual godfather of all historians of China’ (as the sinologist Mark C Elliott put it), and the founder of Chinese frontier studies. Only in the 1990s did scholars like Pamela Crossley, Evelyn Rawski and Elliott finally break ranks to challenge the Sinicisation thesis, instigating what would become the New Qing History school, which demonstrates that the Daiching Empire was an Inner Asian empire and that the Manchus preserved their distinct identity until its very demise. In fact, as my recent scholarship highlights, the Daiching Empire was a Manchu-Mongolian aristocratic empire that conquered and colonised China.

Though the paradigm enacted a wholesale epistemic overhaul, it never succeeded in entirely suppressing critical scholarship. Instead, it produced jarring anomalies that effectively rendered the framework itself an anomaly. The greatest of these anomalies is the rise of the Eurasian steppe empires that dominated agricultural regions – including much or all of present-day China – for much of human history.

Inner Asian nomads consistently ruled over agricultural populations

However, as the paradigm dictates, there can be no state – let alone an empire – on the Eurasian steppe due to geographical, ecological, economic and political constraints. As Scott argues, pastoralism is the foremost state-preventing and state-evading strategy, and the Eurasian steppe is the quintessential nonstate space. Yet, from the dawn of history down to the 20th century, the Eurasian steppe has been the home of numerous empires, many of which conquered and ruled neighbouring agricultural regions. This constitutes a massive anomaly to the paradigm; indeed, because these nomadic empires – most notably the Mongol Empire – fundamentally shaped the world, human history itself becomes an anomaly within this framework. This particular anomaly fundamentally undermines the paradigm: a theory that renders human history anomalous is inherently anomalous itself, for a theory is meant to explain reality, not dismiss it.

A painting of people and horses in traditional garb on a plain background featuring a small dog on the right.

Detail from Kublai Khan Hunting (1280) by Liu Guandao. Courtesy the National Palace Museum, Taipei

The paradox runs deeper, fundamentally uprooting the Sinocentric paradigm at its core. According to this framework, early regional states were founded exclusively by grain agriculturalists, and the empire was always inherently Chinese. However, the earliest states in China – the Shang and the Zhou – were not the making of Yellow River grain, but of western Inner Asian conquests. Moreover, from the rise of the Shang around 1600 BCE to the fall of the Daiching Empire in 1912, Inner Asian nomads consistently ruled over agricultural populations. China, in whole or in part, was absorbed into their empires for nearly three millennia, with nomads building the majority of the region’s states, including most of its expansive and longest-lasting empires. If grain were the primary engine of state formation, none of this should have occurred; instead, the exact opposite would have been true.

Indeed, modern scholarship increasingly attributes early Chinese state formation to nomadic conquest – effectively validating the conquest theory frameworks that predated Lattimore. Victor H Mair’s research demonstrates that, from the beginning in the Shang and Zhou, to the end in the Daiching – including the celebrated Tang – China was a constant creation of Inner Asian empire-builders. Even the Qin and Han carried a ‘likely Central Eurasian heritage’. Strikingly, out of 83 historical polities in the region, only 31 were of Sinitic origin. Mair concludes that these northern conquests ‘were responsible for the creation of the first states in the Yellow River Valley [and] the building of vast empires in Eurasia.’ The Eurasian steppe thus comes to light as the true cradle of state formation and civilisation.

In fact, in a striking parallel to the insights Lattimore articulated in 1934, Hugh R Clark argues that:

for much if not most of the past 3,000 years the zhong guo … has been ruled from the ‘periphery’ … In fact, from the beginning of Zhou rule … until the collapse of the Manchu Qing dynasty … the North China Plain … has been ruled in whole or in part by peoples from ‘outside’ for roughly two of the three millennia. If we also recognise that the Tang ruling family was possibly of Turkish origin and certainly deeply entwined with non-Sinitic elites, we can add another 300 years to that.

The more scholarship advances, the more the invasion theory is validated, and the more the Sinocentric paradigm crumbles. Scott, however, still erases the Eurasian steppe empires by reducing the Mongols, the Manchus, the Huns, the Mughals and the Ottomans to ‘barbarian “stars”’. He insists that they ‘were no different in kind from earlier and smaller nonstate peoples – hunters and gatherers, swiddeners, coastal foragers, herdsmen – who raided small states and traded with them.’

By grounding state-formation in the economy – rendering the state a mere institutional superstructure – evolutionary materialism eliminates extra-economic force and conquest from the equation altogether. Consequently, the state emerges as the exclusive preserve and just deserts of wealthy, populous, industrious societies. Its ascent is framed not just as predictable, but as automatic and inevitable – an assumption so self-evident to scholars like Scott and Mayshar et al that they do not bother to address it at all. This paradigm shift fundamentally alters our understanding of the origin and nature of political power.

In sharp contrast, Max Weber’s theory provides an idealist framework explicitly formulated to counter evolutionary materialism. In this view, history is driven by great ideas, new revelations, powerful beliefs and groundbreaking inventions – transformative forces that Weber conceptualised under a single term: charisma. ‘Charisma,’ he writes in Economy and Society (1921), ‘is the great revolutionary force’ – ‘the specifically creative revolutionary force of history’. Charisma – whether it ‘be of a religious, ethical, artistic, scientific, political, or other kind’ – sits at the root of all human institutions, organisations and arts. Consequently, the institutions of politics, religion, art and the sciences, such as the state, the church and academia, are legacies of generations of charismatic or gifted leadership. The state – a creation of military charisma and charismatic warlord conquest – is the most critical of them. As such, every technological breakthrough – from extrahuman transportation to the iPhone – is ultimately a creation of charisma.

However, it is precisely Fried and Service who erased Weber’s great revolutionary force from state-formation as well as history. They co-opted Weber’s framework of political authority but mutilated it, rendering it unrecognisable. ‘Doing some violence to Weber’s thought,’ in Origins of the State and Civilization (1975), Service mapped Weber’s charismatic authority onto ‘egalitarian-segmental societies’, his traditional authority onto ‘chiefdoms’, and his legal authority onto ‘the government of archaic civilisations’ ‘to epitomise very well the leadership’ in those societies. Thus, Service proscribed Weber’s charismatic and traditional authorities from history and civilisation. As for charisma, both Service and Fried unanimously banished it to pre-historic primitivity, to the sphere of the supernatural, or to madness – ‘a charismatic madman who just happens to be the genealogical leader of the largest kin group,’ as Fried himself put it in Evolution of Political Society (1967). In doing so, they not only effectively erased Weber’s principal agent of state-building but also made it exotic, mad, tribal and barbarian, exiling it to Inner Asia. This transformed Inner Asia into both the womb and tomb of military charisma, and Inner Asian empires into the excesses of military madmen.

Evolutionary materialists purged the patrimonial state from history, equating the state with bureaucracy

Since they also erased traditional authority from the state and civilisation, they both posited bureaucracy – the ultimate expression of Weber’s legal authority – as the definitive form of the state, producing a theoretical scaffolding that renders all premodern political formations, such as patrimonialism, invisible. However, for Weber, bureaucracy is an impersonal rule of law where ‘what [the bureaucrat] obeys is only “the law”.’ In fact, Weber’s legal authority is an abstraction of the modern liberal constitutional state (and its German variant, the Rechtsstaat); his bureaucracy is a modern civil service; and his bureaucrat is a modern civil servant.

Though Weber noted that ‘bureaucracy has first developed in patrimonial states’, he categorically distinguished it from his legal authority and its corresponding bureaucracy. Bureaucracy under traditional authority serves the ‘master’ or the king rather than impersonal rules or the law. For this reason, Weber identifies it as ‘patrimonial officialdom’ and comprehensively contrasts it with ‘bureaucratic officialdom’. In fact, the patrimonial state, or patrimonial dynastic state, is the prime embodiment of Weber’s traditional authority and serves as the major form of all pre-constitutional states. However, by consigning Weber’s traditional authority to chiefdoms, evolutionary materialists purged the patrimonial state from history, effectively equating the state with bureaucracy.

Defining the state by bureaucracy – or equating it with bureaucracy – is tantamount to replacing monarchy, aristocracy and democracy with bureaucracy. The state is a sovereign rulership; hence, there is no form of rulership or political regime called bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is neither rulership nor political. No sovereign, or ruler, is made by appointment. Sovereignty and appointment are mutually exclusive. There can be no appointed sovereign: if appointed, the officeholder is a servant, not a sovereign. Likewise, there can be no bureaucracy and no bureaucrat by virtue of appropriation, election or designation; the appropriation of office and bureaucracy are mutually exclusive. If rulership excludes appointment, appropriation excludes bureaucracy. Bureaucracy follows rulership and serves it; bureaucracy is merely the administrative apparatus of the state. Ultimately, no rule is law if it is not enforced, no land is territory if it is not under sovereignty, and no authority is a bureaucracy if it is not appointed by a ruler. It is rulership that creates law, territory and bureaucracy. By equating the state with bureaucracy, the Sinocentric paradigm not only turned Weber’s theory upside down but also misled us.

Ironically, Weber actually conceptualises the premodern ‘centralised and highly developed administration’ as a product of conquest rule. To maintain domination, the state develops a repressive apparatus to domesticate its subjects. By necessity, it becomes ‘strongest in conquered territories, because of the continuous threat to’ the conquerors. Weber notes:

It is no accident that the Norman states, especially England, were the only feudal states in the Occident with a really centralised and highly developed administration; the same was true of the Arabic, Sassanid and Turkish warrior states, which were most highly organised in conquered areas.

He similarly attributes bureaucratic administration ‘in the Orient’ to ‘new conquerors’ who ‘counteracted quite effectively the otherwise natural process of decentralisation and appropriation.’

Conquerors by necessity had to monopolise power, especially military power, themselves. Yet, because of linguistic, cultural and other local barriers, they had to rely on local interlocutors. However, giving them hereditary military power amounted to creating rival power centres, as the early Manchu creation of the Three Feudatories demonstrates. The most effective means to concentrate power in their own hands, and at the same time efficiently domesticate and administer the conquered population, was to appoint easily removable civilian administrative officials.

However, scholars – including Scott, Fukuyama, Graeber and Wengrow – equate the state with bureaucracy, and search for traces of bureaucracy to find the state. Thus, Scott confidently asserts that ‘it was only in such settings that the first bureaucratic states were likely to arise.’ Graeber and Wengrow go further to advance a novel conceptualisation that essentially defines the state as bureaucracy, ‘as a combination of sovereignty, bureaucracy and a competitive political field.’ Clearly, Jean Bodin’s and Thomas Hobbes’s sovereignty or Weber’s monopoly of violence is not enough to constitute the state. Indeed, Graeber and Wengrow discourse ‘on sovereignty without “the state”’ and search for ‘a great bureaucratic machine’ to find a state. Ultimately, to be a state is to be a bureaucracy. For this reason, Fukuyama in 2011 declares that ‘China alone created a modern state in the terms defined by Max Weber … in developing a centralised, uniform system of bureaucratic administration’. Consequently, by declaring: ‘I take China as a paradigm of state formation and ask why other civilisations didn’t replicate the path it followed,’ Fukuyama positions China as the norm, thereby casting the rest of the world – including Greece, Rome and Europe as a whole – as a ‘divergent’ abnormality, that is, what Lattimore called a ‘barbarian plague’. The Sinocentric paradigm thus places China at the centre and the summit of ‘All under Heaven’.

We set out to learn the origins of the state by studying its preeminent theories and the deep history of the earliest states. Yet, have we truly learned anything about the state’s origins? Or, have we instead, as Scott notes, merely learned what ‘can serve as a basis for taxation’ – namely, its ‘productive base’? Mayshar and his colleagues, who similarly argue that ‘hierarchy arose as a result of the shift to dependence on appropriable cereal grains’, also demonstrate how grain serves as a basis for taxation. This is Scott’s theory of the origin of the state, and it is – one might say – fundamentally a theory of the state’s productive base, not of its origin. Yet, this is the preeminent theory of state origins – the reigning evolutionary, materialist, population-pressure paradigm that I call the Sinocentric paradigm. Ultimately, this paradigm represents a colonial legacy that displaced conquest theory.

What, then, is conquest theory, and what does it say about the origin of the state? What exactly is the state, and how is it defined? Remarkably, both theories accept the same definition of the state. That the state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory is a universally accepted definition. Weber defines the state sociologically ‘only in terms of the specific means peculiar to it, as to every political association, namely, the use of physical force,’ that is, ‘the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force’ (italics original). In short, the state is the institution that exercises a monopoly on legitimate violence. Therefore, when looking for the origin of the state, we should examine how this institution arose. That is exactly what conquest theory does.

Therefore, in looking for the origin of the state, conquest theory examines the rise of physical force – that is, the institution of violence – and the establishment of a monopoly over it. This framework locates that physical force in the warband and the monopoly in the warlord, and explores how that monopoly becomes both necessary and legitimate. Specifically, it finds the monopoly in the need for leadership and organisation within the warband, and the legitimacy in the warband’s need for security. Finally, it explores the conditions that give rise to, or necessitate, this force, and locates those conditions in a state of war.

By rendering the security of the warband paramount, war makes violence legitimate

Making life and liberty scarce, war necessitates physical force in the form of a warband. A warband emerges as a warrior consociation – a community of common political struggle over life and death, and a warrior brotherhood – where individuals are expected to face death in the group’s interest. War also forges the warband into a rational normative community: in Weber’s words, a ‘pressing need for security against internal and foreign enemies induces a growing rationalisation of lawmaking and lawfinding.’ Thus, war creates the warband as a warrior fraternity and a rational-legal consociation.

Demanding unity, organisation, discipline and leadership, war not only moulds a warband into a cohesive group but also fashions the warlord as its leader. In turn, the unity, organisation and discipline – which require both centralised authority and the monopolisation of power – render the warlord a monarch who commands and compels obedience. Ultimately, by rendering the security of the warband paramount, war makes violence legitimate. As Weber writes: ‘Violence acquires legitimacy only in those cases, however – at least initially – in which it is directed against members of the fraternity who have acted treasonably or who have harmed it by disobedience or cowardice.’ Therefore, a warband is a human community that successfully claims a monopoly on the legitimate use of physical force. As such, the rise of the warband marks the beginning of the state. Thus, in the rise of the warband, conquest theory locates both the military differentiation and the military constitution – the archetype of the state. A victorious warband that has successfully established a monopoly of violence over a population in a stretch of land becomes the state.

Therefore, the state is fundamentally a relation of political domination – specifically, domination by virtue of authority (defined as the power to command and the duty to obey) – based ultimately upon a monopoly of violence over life and liberty. It is a domination founded on both the threat to and the protection of life and liberty; this is the fundamental reason for the monopoly of violence, which constitutes sovereignty. In short, war brings kingship as a war power in the form of a warband, and the king as a war leader in the person of a warlord. As Weber observes, ‘Everywhere the king is primarily a warlord,’ and ‘kingship is normally charismatic war leadership that has become permanent and has developed a repressive apparatus for the domestication of the unarmed subjects.’ This is entirely Weber’s theory, and this reading makes him one of the most conceptual, yet profoundly misunderstood, conquest theorists.

It is not resource surplus, scarcity or appropriability that leads to the rise of the state; instead, it is the direct and unmediated monopoly over life and liberty. This domination is not mediated by resource control, but by direct control over life and liberty. For this reason, not only does the political exist on its own terms, but political relationships are also primary and fundamental. It is the political constitution that determines and defines both the social and the economic. Consequently, private property, land scarcity, social stratification and social classes – and, indeed, society and economy – are consequences of the state rather than preconditions for it, institutions ultimately forged by conquest, subjugation, expropriation and political integration.

However, it is not just war per se or armed conflict, but conquest – or wars of conquest – that gives rise to the state, which is why the theory is called conquest theory. This model sees mobility or extrahuman transportation as the decisive revolutionary force. Without extrahuman transportation, forming a large society is impossible, and communities are forced to split and disperse, as observed in Amazonia. Ultimately, extrahuman transportation is what enables conquest and state-building.

The state first arose among nomads, who then conquered neighbouring farming regions

Extrahuman transportation empowered those who possessed it, and made mobilisation – and, consequently, the domination of man over man – possible over large areas. By making mobilisation and concentration possible, extrahuman transportation not only led to the rise of the warband but also, by facilitating conquest, fundamentally changed the nature of war. War was transformed into campaigns of conquest, an enterprise of state-building that rendered communities and their lands the prime targets for subjugation and forced integration into a larger society. Conquest and state-building created what in the 1950s Rüstow termed an ‘opening configuration’. This ‘new configuration’ served as ‘a new natural aggregation of external and internal factors of human life’, providing the ‘opening configuration for the development of all high cultures’ – the state and society.

Because pastoralists possessed extrahuman transportation in the form of herding animals, the conquest theory argues that the state first arose among nomads, who then conquered neighbouring farming regions. For this reason, the conquest theory is primarily a theory of nomadic conquest over sedentary farmers. In addition to high mobility, the theory identifies military leadership, organisation, discipline, martial skills and a warrior ethos as key cultural factors in the rise of the state, noting that these qualities are highly developed among pastoralists. Undeniably, frequent long-distance migration with large herds under harsh and unpredictable conditions naturally fosters these leadership and martial attributes.

While conquests by equestrian warrior nomads were the most consequential in the rise of the state and civilisation, the conquest theory maps a broader historical sequence. It posits a series of conquests over time: first of hunters over cultivators, then of herdsmen over planters and peasants and, finally, of European colonial powers. Conquest theory by no means valorises conquest; instead, it views it as creating despotic, two-strata class states whose toxic legacies we must confront and overcome. Indeed, conquest theory offers a radically different vision and framework to make sense of the human journey and its historical trajectory. It presents a vision neither of ever-evolving progress nor of inevitability, but equally not of permanent entrapment or doom.

Through this lens, much like conquests, each and every progressive political, social, economic and cultural achievement of the modern era, just like each conquest of the previous era, stems from a charismatic revolution – be it political, social, economic or scientific – aimed at dismantling the bitter legacies of institutional injustice and natural limitations. From the early foundational shifts of liberal revolutions and constitutionalism, to global decolonisation, to human and environmental rights frameworks; and from the Industrial Revolution, to the rise of STEM, to the advent of AI – all are, for better or worse, the fruits of charismatic ideas, individuals, endeavours and movements. Ultimately, it is not the invisible engine of evolution that drives history, but the fire of human agency.

Though the human journey remains a persistent pursuit of freedom, its trajectory is conceptualised as a transition from the despotic, two-strata, class-based ‘State of robbery’ to the ‘Freemen’s Citizenship’ of the future (as Franz Oppenheimer put it in 1914) – a self-governing society – progressing through a series of states, including constitutional ones. However, the path of progress is neither linear nor consistent. Every step of liberation has been shaped by historical contingencies, facing severe setbacks, systemic backlash and profound failures along the way. Moreover, the achievements of today’s charismatic revolutions routinely become tomorrow’s institutional trap and bulwark: the liberating ideas of one era harden into the systemic barriers of the next. Progress, therefore, remains trapped in a perpetual cycle of revolution and institutionalisation. Despite these fractures and constraints, the core drive remains unyielding: charisma – a deeply human, deeply individual, and deeply personal impulse for freedom.

Through this lens, the Sinocentric paradigm misconstrues the human past, present and future; it rationalises the past as a product of ecology and evolution; and it naturalises the present as given, and the future as fated. It misguides us, blaming our numbers for our conduct. It attributes what was, and is, cultural to nature, and supposes what was, and is, natural to be cultural.

Conquest theory arms us with a framework to not only break free from the Sinocentric paradigm but also to critically re-evaluate human history, fully reclaim our agency, and purposefully chart our own future. Only by overcoming the Sinocentric paradigm and embracing conquest theory can we construct a human history that fully appreciates the significance of the extrahuman transportation outlined at the outset of this essay. Such an account will be more than the new history of humanity that Graeber and Wengrow deemed necessary; it will provide a framework that finally rescues human history from being treated as an anomaly.



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Im a doctor in training and I believe in a secular world