Taking the Place of the Stranger: Leibniz and the Ethics of Migration
A border looks different depending on which side of it one stands. To a citizen, it may appear as a line of defense: a necessary guarantee of order, security, and political sovereignty. To a migrant, it may look like a wall against hope, a bureaucratic machine that turns fear into paperwork and danger into indefinite delay. The challenge of an ethics of migration lies in this tension between different standpoints. Leibniz did not write a theory of migration in anything like the modern sense. The political world he inhabited was not yet organized around the same forms of border control, citizenship, asylum, and administrative classification that shape present debates. Nevertheless, a short text called “The Place of Others,” included in my recently published three-volume edition of Leibniz’s Philosophical Papers 1677–1686 (Oxford University Press, 2026), offers an illuminating way of approaching a central difficulty in contemporary debates about migration, namely: whose standpoint counts? In this text, Leibniz reflects on the practice of imaginatively changing positions with another person, claiming that “the place of others is the …






