By the mid-20th century, French philosopher Henri Bergson had gone from the most celebrated philosopher in the world to an academic embarrassment. His compatriot, philosopher Gilles Deleuze, thought this verdict was deeply misguided. Bergsonism was to recover what philosophy had carelessly thrown away. Deleuze published Bergsonism in 1966, building on essays on Bergson he had been writing since the 1950s. The book covered key concepts of Bergson’s philosophy, such as duration, memory, and life as a creative force. It is important to keep this text clearly separate from his later work on cinema. Cinema 1 appeared nearly two decades afterward, and it covers different territory.
Bergson Went From World-Famous to Academic Embarrassment
Henri Bergson was once the most famous philosopher in the world. In the early 20th century, crowds filled lecture halls to hear him speak. In November 1928, the Swedish Academy awarded Bergson the reserved 1927 Nobel Prize in Literature, though severe illness prevented him from attending the Stockholm ceremony in person. Despite the lack of attention today, Bergson was celebrated, debated, and widely read in and beyond France. But only within a very specific period.
Around the middle of the century, Bergson had become something of an embarrassment in French philosophical circles. Existentialism took hold in Paris, followed by structuralism and, eventually, post-structuralism. None of the movements had patience for Bergson’s conceptual apparatus of vital forces, inner duration, and lived time. In the eyes of the new generation of intellectuals, the vocabulary was suspiciously reminiscent of irrationalism and mysticism. Sartre was the new trend. Bergson receded into the background as his books started to accumulate dust.
The academic consensus began to gain international reach. Bertrand Russell attacked Bergson’s philosophy, labeling it anti-intellectual. The label stuck. Bergson was filed away as a relic: He was accused of confusing poetry with argument, emotion with logic, affect with reason. Some would admire him “as a writer” only to condemn his philosophy.
This was the intellectual climate Gilles Deleuze walked into when he published Bergsonism in 1966. The book arrived at a moment when defending Bergson required genuine philosophical courage. An intellectual act of resistance. Deleuze believed that Bergson had posed genuine problems, problems that have been misunderstood and carried over unsolved.
The dismissals of Bergsonism were only able to target superficial caricatures, straw men, so to speak. The real Bergson was still waiting to be discovered. Bergsonism was Deleuze’s heroic attempt to carry out the discovery; a new reading of Bergson.
Deleuze Defended Bergson Because Philosophy Had Abandoned Time
Deleuze was not a historian of philosophy in any conventional sense, nor was he interested in producing faithful reconstructions of dead thinkers. He described his method as a kind of philosophical encounter. Deleuze is notorious for reading the work of philosophers so closely that something genuinely new emerges from the collision. A monster of sorts. He called it a form of immaculate conception. The philosopher takes the thinker from behind and produces an offspring that is recognizably theirs yet strangely uncanny.
Bergson was more than an encounter for Deleuze. Bergson was arguably the most influential in shaping Deleuze’s own philosophical methodology.
Through Bergson, Deleuze found what was missing from contemporary philosophy. From the dominant traditions of his era: phenomenology, structuralism, analytic philosophy. These movements shared a tendency to privilege space as an ontological hinge for certainty over time. They analyzed structures conceived as static forms. Nonetheless, they failed to account for real novelty.
True novelty is nothing like shuffling a deck of cards. It is not a rearrangement of fixed elements. It is a change that produces something irreducible. Time as Duration: this is one of the central concepts that anchor Bergsonian ontology. Duration refers to real, lived, experiential time. Continuous, flowing, and very difficult to measure or map out.
It was pivotal for Deleuze that Bergson, no less than Heidegger, took time seriously. In opposition to the Einsteinian clock time; the spatialized, quantified time of physics, Bergson offers us an account of real, qualitative, temporal variability.
Last but not least, the Bergsonian account of time entails serious political ramifications. Bergson’s philosophy resisted the idea that reality is fully knowable through analysis alone. Cutting things up, dissecting reality into its smallest constituent elements, may not solve some of the important philosophical puzzles. Bergson challenged the philosophical assumption that reality is reducible to measure.
Bergsonism Rests on Three Theses: Duration, Memory, and Life
Deleuze’s Bergsonism is structured around three central claims. Together, these shape the backbone of Bergson’s metaphysics. Understanding the three theses of Bergsonism offers the key to everything that follows in this series.
The first thesis, already mentioned, concerns duration, or durée. Bergson argues that time, as it is lived experientially, is not a sequence of homogeneous, measurable instants. It is a continuous flow of interpenetrating tendencies. We, or the physicists, to be precise, slice time into units. Seconds, minutes, and hours: temporal measurements are useful in practice. Measurement allows us to dominate and manipulate nature. But it results in a distortion of reality. Duration is fundamentally qualitative. It cannot be divided without it changing its nature as a result. This is interesting for Deleuze. The conclusion implies that change and variability are essential components of lived time.
The second thesis concerns memory. Bergson makes a radical claim: the past is never really past. It never really passes, so to speak. It perseveres entirely, co-existing with the present. Bergson rejects the idea of memory as an experience that gradually fades. Nor did he endorse the idea that memory is somehow stored and then retrieved by the brain. Memory for Bergson is virtual. It is an ever-present potentiality. Deleuze will transform this insight into one of his most powerful concepts: the virtual and the actual.
The third thesis introduces the vital impulse: élan vital. Life, for Bergson, is a kind of creative force that differentiates itself into divergent lines. Evolution is an explosion of difference. Bergson does not interpret it as a teleological force that strives toward a pre-determined purpose.
Bergsonism: The Book and Its Method
Deleuze’s Bergsonism is a short book. At roughly one hundred pages, one might be deceived into thinking it is a relaxing evening read. Its compact structure should by no means be mistaken for simplicity. Deleuze packs an enormous amount into the five chapters, and every sentence requires unsparing attention.
Deleuze is known for dedicating his books to individual philosophers. He has written multiple monographs on Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and Spinoza. But Bergsonism is not a straightforward commentary. Deleuze is not interested in walking the reader through Bergson’s arguments page by page. This is neither an introduction nor a typical companion book. Deleuze wants to extract the “virtual center” of Bergson’s thought; the core set of problems that animate the philosophy beneath the surface.
The method produces its own set of consequences. Deleuze reads Bergson selectively, drawing primarily from three major works: Time and Free Will (1889), Matter and Memory (1896), and Creative Evolution (1907). He treats these three books as multiple stages within a single developing argument. Each one, in his reading, advances a distinct thesis that needs to be reintegrated with the rest.
With Bergson, Deleuze finds a philosopher who is intensely obsessed with a single underlying problem: how do we think about difference in a non-reductive way? How do we keep the concept rich?
Philosophy has traditionally explained difference by reference to identity. Things differ because they contrast, or otherwise fall away from something fixed. According to Deleuze, Bergson reverses this. Difference becomes primary. Identity becomes secondary. Identity, in fact, becomes a practical simplification we impose on reality. Reality is, in truth, always already in motion.
This is precisely why Bergsonism is more than an introduction. It is a demonstration of Deleuze’s own philosophical commitments. A manifesto disguised as a monograph.
Five Articles Map Bergsonism, From Intuition to the Élan Vital
This article is the first in a series. Each article draws on a key concept from Deleuze’s Bergsonism and attempts to break it down into simpler, more accessible components. Without seeking to reduce Bergsonism to a single book, the articles will attempt to think through the ideas dynamically, one at a time, and to demonstrate their contemporary relevance.
The second article examines intuition as a method. Intuition is a Bergsonian concept that has left a lasting impression on Deleuze. The method of intuition is the path that leads to the rest of the concepts. Without the concept of intuition, all the others, namely, duration, memory, and the élan vital, remain abstract and incomprehensible.
The third article unpacks the notion of duration. What does it mean to say that time is qualitative? How is lived time different from clock time? And why does Deleuze think that Bergson’s account of duration provides the basis for an entirely new theory of difference? These are the questions that the article will try to tackle.
The fourth article turns to the virtual and the actual. These are arguably Deleuze’s most influential conceptual distinctions, and they have their roots firmly planted in Bergson’s theory of memory. This is also one of the most misunderstood distinctions in all of the Deleuzian oeuvre. They will require close and careful examination.
The fifth and final article addresses the élan vital. Bergson’s concept of the vital impulse has been mocked and dismissed more than almost any other idea in modern philosophy. Deleuze’s courageous rescue shelters it from reductive criticisms and reveals it to be a sophisticated account of life as creative differentiation.
Taken together, these five articles offer a map of Bergsonism and hopefully an effective entry point into one of the intriguing hidden corners of 20th-century philosophy.