Ask what makes a human life go well, and within a sentence or two you are talking about other people. This is because humans are a highly social, cooperative species that relies on working together to survive. Our ability to cooperate with anyone on almost any task is our evolutionary superpower. Aristotle thought the flourishing life—the life worth living—was unthinkable without friends, and that a man who had every other good but lacked friends would still not be satisfied with his life. The well-being research of the last few decades has mostly proven him right. The sturdiest predictor of who thrives is the quality of the relationships that one has with other people. As social animals, humans need solid relationships with others to flourish.
In this social conception of the good life, though, resides a philosophical wrinkle. If a good life requires solid relationships with others, then whatever makes good relationships possible is also what makes a flourishing life possible. And, as it happens, such relationships often thrive when we know less about them, rather than more, even though people tend to assume the opposite. A common assumption here is that a life goes best when it is maximally informed, that more knowledge of our partners, of ourselves, of the strangers we deal with can only help to facilitate and improve those relationships. For the goods that actually make up a flourishing life, that assumption is often wrong. The intimacy that holds a marriage together, the self-regard that facilitates someone acting at all, and the social trust that enables cooperation among strangers each depend, at the margins, on someone knowing less about those relationships.
This logic is borrowed from economics. What matters about a piece of knowledge is often not the total value, but rather the value at the margin, where the benefit of acquiring the next piece of knowledge is balanced against the cost of acquiring it. The first few facts you learn about a partner, a neighbor, or yourself are enormously valuable. However, with each added fact, it is worth less, such that, eventually, the value goes from positive to negative (say, learning how much money the neighbors spent on food on their last Disneyland trip). At this point, more knowledge can make the relationship worse, not better. Consider three relationships at the heart of a flourishing life, namely those relationships with romantic partners and friends, those we have with ourselves, and those that we have with strangers with whom we must live together (say, our fellow citizens and neighbors). As it happens, in each case, knowing less about the people in those relationships can make them go better, not worse. Let’s begin with our romantic partners.
Knowing Less to Live Better With Romantic Partners
Let’s start with the relationships that the literature on well-being ranks highest—the partnerships and close friendships that make life worth living. In a now-classic set of studies, Sandra Murray and her colleagues followed dating and married couples and found that the partners who idealized each other at the margins—who saw each other more generously than the partners saw themselves (and even more generously than the facts allowed)—were more satisfied with the relationship and less likely to split compared to those couples that didn’t indulge in such marginal ignorance.
The intimacy on which a good life is built is held up by a willingness to leave certain truths soft-focused.
Here, partner idealization was measured as the gap between how favorably one would rate their partner and how the partners rated themselves. People’s impressions tracked their own ideals more than their partner’s actual self-reported traits. This is because their perceptions of their partners were inaccurate, the product of projection. And the projection paid off with greater levels of idealization at the start, and to a degree, predicted more relationship satisfaction a year later, with the arrow running from illusion to happiness instead of the other way around where the studies found that happy couples didn’t necessarily idealize their partners at the margin, but that couples who idealized their partners at the margin were more likely to be happy. Here it is worth noting what that means for flourishing. The intimacy on which a good life is built is held up by a willingness to leave certain truths soft-focused.
John Gottman’s decades of watching couples point to the same logic but coming from the opposite direction where stable marriages are marked by a healthy ratio of positive to negative attention—the famous five-to-one—with couples who fall below that ratio being at sharply higher risk of divorce. The couples who thrive are those who have figured out which faults to leave alone and attend to less, thereby knowing less at the margin about them. This is the cognitive habit psychologists call the Pollyanna Principle, where our tendency to hold onto and weight the positive is not a bias to be fixed, but instead is what facilitated a shared life with romantic partners and close friends.
It is worth clarifying why more knowledge actively hurts here, because the obvious objection is that good relationships run on honesty. And there is something to that objection. However, it is worth noting that the first tranche of knowledge about a partner is indispensable. One cannot love another deeply and genuinely without knowing anything about them. To give an example, ignoring a genuinely abusive or incompatible partner is a disaster. However, beyond a certain threshold of knowledge, where you know enough to commit wisely to someone, learning more about them can have major downsides. Knowing where your partner ranked you among the alternatives, every private criticism they have swallowed, every passing attraction to someone else does little, if anything, to improve the relationship (and could even damage it).
Our ability to cooperate with anyone on almost any task is our evolutionary superpower.
This is why a certain incuriosity works, in love, as a benefit when it is at the margin and when it is operating in an otherwise relatively healthy relationship. Not only that, but when a partner declines to dig for what might disappoint them, they give up information that might, in narrow self-interested terms, be useful. But the willingness to forgo knowing is itself a costly signal of commitment. And the payoff runs past the relationship itself and includes other benefits for each member of the couple including improved subjective well-being and increased physical health and longevity, with effects that can sometimes rival familiar medical risk factors. The lesson about knowing less applies to our relationships with ourselves just as much as our relationships with romantic partners and close friends.
Knowing Less to Live Better With Ourselves
The second relationship a flourishing life depends on is the one we have with ourselves. To do anything in the world—to get up in the morning, to risk failure and moral compromise—it must be that a person is able to envision themselves as competent and morally decent. Self-regard is fragile and it is threatened by knowing the full, unflattering truth about our motives, failures, and ordinary moral mediocrity. The usual story treats the ignorance that protects self-regard as a kind of psychological painkiller that has benefits but is regrettable, indulgent, tolerable only in small doses. But this story vastly undersells the value of knowing less about ourselves. And this is where self-deception is one of the things a flourishing life requires.
As the economists Kevin Simler and Robin Hanson argue in the book The Elephant in the Brain, building on a line of argument that runs back to Robert Trivers, people deceive themselves for the simple reason that for most people lying is hard. A person who consciously knows their own ulterior motives leaks them—via hesitation, micro-expression, the tells we cannot police—and so the most reliable way to convince others of something is to believe it yourself. On this view the conscious mind is kept in the dark on purpose for the simple reason that an agent who sincerely believes their own favorable story is better able to convince others. Self-deception, in other words, is a feature of our social design, and its payoffs show up where a flourishing life is negotiated, namely in conflict, in cooperation, and in love. Consider three cases.
- The first is bluffing, whether in a war, tough negotiation, or even a game of cards. The party that is able to credibly convey it will not back down is more likely to win the standoff, but credibility is the catch. The negotiator who has convinced himself that he will walk away with a big win carries a conviction that an accurate self-assessment would betray.
- The second is the entrepreneur. Most new businesses fail, and as such, a perfectly calibrated founder would likely decline to found one. The founder brimming with possibly unearned confidence who attracts the talent and capital that a clear-eyed realist never could relies on self-deception to do it (think Steve Jobs). Here better knowledge of the prospects of new business would be individually prudent and collectively impoverishing for the simple reason that economic dynamism is fed by people who overrate their odds.
- The third returns us to romantic partners and close friends. The process of idealizing your spouse—as discussed in the first section—is easier done if you are also a little self-deceived since honest scrutiny of yourself tends to bleed into honest scrutiny of everyone else. The faculty that lets one downplay one’s own failings does the same for loved ones too. What unites the three is that accurate self-knowledge would strategically self-defeat, where the one with a clear-eyed view of reality does worse, by the lights of flourishing, than the marginally self-deceived one.
There is a subtler twist that flips the usual story about self-knowledge on its head. We assume that knowing ourselves deeply makes us shrewder in our dealings with others, except that past a point, it can do the opposite. Because we know much more about our own histories, motives, and inner contradictions than anyone else does, we badly overrate how legible we are, and we get worse at predicting how we actually come across. Experiments on this asymmetry find that people, like jurors instructed to ignore inadmissible evidence, cannot set aside their private self-knowledge when trying to guess how other people evaluate them. The first instances of self-knowledge can sharpen our understanding of ourselves, but beyond a certain point—which varies from person to person—knowing too much weakens our ability to determine how we are perceived by others and gums up the most routine encounters. Self-knowledge, like every other kind of knowledge, runs into diminishing returns. Sometimes knowing less about ourselves lets us see more clearly how we look to the people whose regard we depend on.
All of this invites the obvious worry that if self-deception is this useful, then anything goes? It does not, and the line is sharp enough to hold. Productive self-deception enables a good that honest belief would foreclose, such as resolve, ambition, and the staying power of love. Evasive self-deception launders an obligation such as when the bargain shopper would rather not learn how the cheap goods were made in order to keep a clean conscience without feeling psychological pressure to change their behavior.
To trust someone is to act without demanding the proof that would justify confidence, to proceed on good faith rather than verification.
The first kind of self-deception is what enables a flourishing life, while the second is moral evasion in the guise of innocence and is genuinely blameworthy. The deciding factor here is whether knowing less is what enables a good, flourishing life, or whether it dodges a duty. So, in many cases, a flourishing life is partly constituted by self-deception, but only in ways that are not morally or epistemically dodgy.
Knowing Less to Live Better With Strangers
Flourishing is not limited to our immediate relationships and surroundings, but instead extends to our relationships, minimal though they often are, with strangers like the people who grow our food, build our houses, treat our illnesses, and keep thousands of promises we never check. What makes that wider economic and social apparatus possible is trust, and trust, at bottom, is a form of knowing less. To trust someone is to act without demanding the proof that would justify confidence, to proceed on good faith rather than verification. The trusting person has decided, in effect, that they would rather not know because, in that context, finding out would cost more than the information is worth.
This is why general social trust is among the strongest predictors of a society’s prosperity and its members’ well-being. In the line of work descending from Knack and Keefer, higher rates of agreement that “most people can be trusted” predict faster economic growth; Zak and Knack’s much-cited estimate puts the effect at close to a full percentage point of annual growth for a one-standard-deviation rise in trust, though economists add, rightly, that the exact magnitude shifts with how the model is specified. The mechanism, as the economist Benjamin Ho puts it, is that trust substitutes for information by sparing us the high cost of vetting every counterparty, letting cooperation run on reciprocity instead of surveillance.
The machinery here explains why firms exist and why contracts are deliberately incomplete because verifying everything is so expensive that functioning institutions economize by trusting instead. Picture the alternative in concrete terms where, in low-trust societies, every exchange demands vetting. Buyers investigate sellers twice over, employers surveil employees far past anything performance requires, citizens audit institutions rather than rely on them with each verification step costing a huge amount of time, attention, money, and opportunity costs. Here the costs compound into an enormous, mostly invisible tax on cooperation. Such societies are both poorer and more anxious, more isolated, with less flourishing. What trust buys, by letting us know less about the people around us, is the ease and openness with which a flourishing social existence becomes possible.
Here, of course, it is worth noting that misplaced trust is dangerous, leading to fraud, betrayal, and being taken advantage of for extending faith they should have withheld. The marginal framing is what answers it. There is an optimal margin with enough verification, supplied mostly by institutions and reputational norms rather than by each anxious individual, to make trust reasonable, and then a decision to stop checking.
Sometimes knowing less about ourselves lets us see more clearly how we look to the people whose regard we depend on.
The flourishing society is neither the maximally trusting one nor the maximally suspicious one. It is the one that has built enough background assurance that its members can rationally afford to know little about each other, and then go on to enjoy the cooperation that knowing less makes possible. There is something almost paradoxical in this because we picture trust as a reward for knowledge, but generalized social trust extends to people we know little to nothing about, by design, because the world around us has been arranged to make social trust productive and beneficial.
Knowing Less for a Flourishing Life
The value of knowing less is essential for our flourishing. In such cases, the marginal value of knowledge goes negative sooner than we expect, and living well means knowing where and knowing less, even if the reigning assumption of our moment runs the other way. It is widely held that flourishing scales with information and that more knowledge will improve our relationships, our self-understanding, and our institutions without limit. Except that for the social goods that flourishing consists in, the evidence keeps pointing the opposite way.
The fully transparent marriage, the person who sees every truth about themselves in permanent high resolution, the society where everyone must be verified before anyone can be trusted are antithetical to flourishing because knowing too much can inhibit our relationships rather than facilitating and strengthening them. So, then, we are left to conclude that knowing less is key to building good relationships, and by extension, key to a good and flourishing life.
