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Why We Still Need the West – by Ghia Nodia

Why We Still Need the West – by Ghia Nodia


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It is increasingly popular to say that the West is no more. And President Trump is seen as the main (though not the only) person responsible for its demise.

If this is so, I consider it bad news, though many others—both within the West and outside it—might say “good riddance.” They associate the concept with imperial domination over “the Rest,” or of the United States over Europe, which is based on military and economic power. I have at least two reasons to mourn the possible demise of the West. As a global citizen, I believe that while “the West” in its different iterations did many good things and many bad things, the former far outweighed the latter. Ending slavery, inventing and promoting a model of governance based on limited and accountable government, and recognizing women’s equality with men are only a few of its most welcome innovations. One may even wonder whether they will be sustainable if the West no longer exists or becomes irrelevant.

Moreover, the end of “the West” as we know it would be terrible news for me as a patriotic Georgian. From the late 1980s, when my country started its fight to remove the shackles of the Russian communist empire and create (or restore) an independent state, the idea of joining the West through its main institutions—NATO, and the European Union—has been central to Georgia’s political vision, shared by an overwhelming majority of its citizens and its political elite. Only within the Western-supported liberal world order can a small country maintain its sovereign existence. Furthermore, Georgians aspired to emulate the Western model of liberal democracy, and knew that being part of the West and having a liberal democracy were strongly correlated. Even now, being “pro-Western” and “pro-democracy” mean the same thing in Georgia.

Starting around 2022, the Georgian Dream (GD) government, led by Bidzina Ivanishvili, a billionaire who made his fortune in Russia, rejected the West, presenting it as ruled by the mysterious “Global War Party” keen to drag Georgia into a war with Russia, and embarking on a comprehensive campaign of destroying Georgian civil society. This sparked strong protests that still refuse to abate. However, because of broad popular support for the idea of Western integration, even GD feels obliged to pay lip service occasionally.

The idea of “the West” was constructed in the 19th century to carry on—as well as to modify—two broad civilizational visions: those of “Christendom” and “Europe.” The former no longer fit a rationalist, positivist 19th century, but “Europe” did not work either: the new idea of “the West” kept religiously Christian and geographically European Russia out and the United States in. Such a concept was needed to encompass political powers and societies that espoused (or were expected to espouse) Enlightenment-based values and norms that can be broadly described as a liberal worldview. Opinions about the West’s borders varied over time: sometimes Germany was excluded, and at other times Russia was even considered a possible member; in either case, the standard for inclusion or exclusion was primarily based on values, norms, and ways of life.

The image of the West that people usually have in mind today was shaped in the aftermath of World War II. It became synonymous with the “Free World,” comprising the United States and Western Europe, professing political, economic, and personal freedoms, and standing in opposition to the part of the world that denied those freedoms—the Russia-led communist camp.

The Western commitment to freedom was never impeccable. It included politically unfree countries such as Spain and Portugal and propped up ruthless dictators in different parts of the world as long as they opposed the West’s main adversary, the communists. However, this was justified by the necessities of the power struggle: smaller demons had to be tolerated as allies against the larger and more dangerous one—just as it had earlier been deemed right to ally with Joseph Stalin against Adolf Hitler.

The allure of Western freedom and prosperity evolved into an irresistible “soft power” that contributed to the communist world’s implosion from within. Most formerly communist nations based their policy visions on Western norms, and many of them approximated them in their new institutions.

As many of the former “captive nations” joined the West, the idealized image inevitably faded, though not fully. Georgia is a country where the idea of Europe or the West, and the prospect of joining it, remains a source of inspiration for people who would not accept living in a Eurasian-style autocracy.

One should remember that the West’s passing has been heralded many times before, yet it eventually overcame multiple crises and emerged from them even stronger. Francis Fukuyama recently recalled his renowned 1989 article on the “End of History,” which implied the triumph of Western ideas and norms as the chief outcome of the Cold War; ironically, the article emerged from a lecture in a series titled “The Decline of the West.” This time the identifiable signs of decline are especially salient, yet one cannot rule out that the West may be undergoing another painful but inevitable process of redefinition and reformatting.

Two main ideas have historically made the idea of the West meaningful: a critical degree of transatlantic unity, and a basic consensus on values, norms, and ways of life. In both cases, we see alarming signs. But how deep and irreversible is the malaise?

It is often assumed that the principal threat comes from the rise of nationalist populism, which erodes the idea and reality of the Western alliance in both dimensions: it undermines transatlantic unity as well as the fundamental liberal values and norms that underpin the idea of the West. Because Trump is by far the most powerful populist leader in the world, his anti-European statements and actions attract the greatest attention. However, European populists also ride the horse of anti-Americanism.

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The idea of the West and its values and norms has also been attacked from the left. These attacks are often justified as an effort to expose the hypocrisies of Western political systems and the evil deeds committed in its name. In this regard, it has become common to trace the concept of the West to the late nineteenth century and to associate it primarily with imperial expansion. Framed in this way, this idea is linked to domination, exploitation, violence, and racial hierarchy, rather than to the intellectual and political legacy of the Enlightenment; in this narrative, even the promotion of democracy and human rights is primarily a smokescreen for imperial aggrandizement.

Self-doubt and self-criticism are necessary and productive elements of the Western mindset—without them, there would be no development or necessary renewal. However, obsessive collective self-flagellation undermines the very values that ostensibly “progressive” intellectuals claim to defend. Ideas such as liberty, equality, the rule of law, respect for human rights, and acceptance of cultural diversity may be universal in content and aspiration; however, they have Western historical origins and are still predominantly practiced in and advocated by Western societies. One cannot credibly champion these principles while portraying the West as inherently despicable.

It is this two-pronged attack on the ideas and values of the West that is the greatest ground for concern. One can argue forever which version of the anti-Enlightenment attack is more dangerous: that coming from the left or from the right. However, their simultaneous rise is genuinely scary. The success of post-war Western liberal democracies rested not only on competition but also on a tacit consensus between center-left and center-right parties that shared basic liberal values and jointly dominated the political scene. Now this tacit consensus and the parties that represented it are squeezed from both sides. This implies a genuine crisis of the West; if the trend continues, it may end in its suicide.

Explicit attacks against different aspects of “the West” are only part of the story. After the end of the Cold War, there emerged a trend that the historian Michael Kimmage described as the “abandonment of the West”; this did not imply denouncing the West as something bad, but deeming the concept no longer useful. For instance, in 1993, Owen Harries (co-founder of the journal that published Fukuyama’s “End of History?” article) argued that this concept had only been valid in the context of the Cold War, when the West had to be unified against the common enemy; with the demise of the enemy, there was no need for “the West” either.

Supposedly, there was also a deeper reason for abandoning the West. If the model it represented—liberal democracy conjoined with a mixture of market economy and welfare state—has decisively proven itself to be the best possible option for humanity, it was natural to expect that it would switch from being something mainly characteristic of the West to becoming the universal norm shared by the whole (or most) of humanity. A planet that embraced historically Western norms no longer needed a specific concept of “the West.”

This also allowed us to avoid a certain important awkwardness that existed around this concept. Western liberals tended to de-emphasize the civilizational origin of their outlook, underscoring its universalistic substance instead. This was understandable because local nativists as well as Western leftists portrayed global advocacy of the liberal worldview as a smokescreen for a more sophisticated form of neo-imperial domination. Hence, “the West” was replaced by an ostensibly inclusive euphemism of the “international community.” However, it was still tacitly implied that Western powers would play a leading role within this nebulous entity.

A noble yet somewhat vague concept of the “liberal international order” belongs to this family of concepts. As a Georgian, I am particularly partial to this idea, because my country—being small and vulnerable—can only be relatively secure within such an order. However, it was never clear who would guarantee its effective enforcement. Politically correct analysts pinned their hopes on the United Nations, but with Russia and China among its key decision makers, this was naïve and unrealistic. Few would openly acknowledge that any hope for a liberal international order requires “unipolar” domination by Western liberal powers.

I (and most liberal Georgians) would not object to living in an international order defined by the hopefully benign domination of the liberal West—though I know that many nations strongly resist this prospect. However, did Western nations ever have a truly coherent vision of how the liberal world order would work? Were they willing to commit necessary resources to this costly and thankless task? And—even with a positive answer to both questions—was the West ever powerful enough to be a successful enforcer? The debacles in Afghanistan and Iraq (when the United States was at its most confident and willing), the rise of China, and Russia’s resentful revisionism, which the West is unable to properly punish, dispelled such illusions. The post-Cold War “unipolar moment” passed, and something different has started to emerge, for which we don’t have a name yet. What we now describe as “the crisis of the West” is, to a considerable extent, a crisis of expectations produced by the apparent Western victory in the Cold War.

If the idea of the “Globalized West” obviously failed, should this not prepare the ground for a regeneration of the old-fashioned idea of “the West” in some new shape? The Russian invasion of Ukraine and reactions to it became a crucial testing ground. Putin never concealed that the true objective of his war was not so much territorial expansion as exposing the limitations of Western power. At least initially, the West took the message and displayed a high level of unity. On the other hand, it soon became evident, though rarely explicitly underscored, that only the West and a handful of its traditional allies joined the pro-Ukraine rally. The West was left effectively alone to defend the vestiges of the “liberal international order.”

We know that, in the face of a protracted war whose outcome remains uncertain, this unity is precarious. Even at the initial stage of greater moral clarity, the West failed to commit sufficient resources to a Ukrainian victory. With Trump entering the fray, things got much worse, and the rise of populist parties in Europe threatens further deterioration. However, Western unity has been shaky before, including in periods when it faced the Soviet (and, before that, the fascist) threats. Western Europeans have always resented American leadership, while the latter has always accused Europeans of being parasitic in security matters, at America’s expense.

However, the fundamental issue defining the concept’s viability is whether the global political environment truly requires some level of Western unity. The Russian invasion, and its effective support by other authoritarian powers, have falsified Owen Harries’ assumption that the West no longer has a common enemy to speak of. The anti-Western solidarity of Russia, China, Iran, and other quite different actors indicates that the idea of the West is still a tangible entity, at least in the perception of its enemies. It’s only natural for the nations that have traditionally been unified under this concept to recognize this reality and reassert themselves as such.

The crisis of Western liberal democracy is very real; its future may be the most important question in contemporary politics—and one to which we do not have a definitive answer. But one can confidently say that the viability of the concept of the West ultimately depends on the answer to this question. Conversely, even though one can continue to hope for the eventual global triumph of liberal democracy—as many of us did in the 1990s—for the time being, the prospect of democratic order still largely depends on its sustainability in America and Europe.

Ghia Nodia is a professor of politics at Ilia Chavchavadze State University in Tbilisi, Georgia.

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