Philosophy

It’s not political: the young fashionistas of Tehran

It’s not political: the young fashionistas of Tehran


Yasaman* is one of the regulars on Iranshahr, the new fashion hub of Tehran. Most evenings, she sets up a stall on the pavement and sells her drawings of manga and anime characters. On social media, she sports her own manga-inspired look: pink hair, pink mouth and smudgy pink eyeshadow extending beyond the corner of each eye. She tells her followers that, before she leaves her house, her mother says: ‘Put on less makeup.’ ‘Mum, be reasonable,’ she answers. ‘I’m going to Iranshahr. For Iranshahr this is nothing. I’m going to Paris Fashion Week. You know everyone there is doing a catwalk.’

Iranshahr’s sidewalks teem with young people parading the latest fashions and filming other young, stylish people for their social media feeds. This is where the fashionistas congregate, hanging out in cafés and galleries, and mingling on the sidewalks. Barely a headscarf is visible. The streets looked nothing like this a few years ago, but once the American-Israeli attacks began in February this year, the Islamic Republic has been fighting for its survival: with much of its leadership killed, the Strait of Hormuz under siege, and many of the country’s neighbours in league with the enemy, policing what people wear has slipped a long way down its list of priorities.

The hijab law has been codified in Iran since 1983, enforced nationwide by the ‘morality’ police. Disobeying it meant fines, flogging or imprisonment. But then one act of disobedience changed everything. In December 2017, Vida Movahed, a woman in her 30s, climbed onto a utility box on Enghelab Street in Tehran, took off her white headscarf and held it up on a stick. Although she was arrested and later sentenced to a year in prison, her action proved contagious. Other women climbed up onto boxes and makeshift plinths in the same street, waving their headscarves in the air. People began calling them the Girls of Enghelab Street. They were arrested too. It is hard to convey now how much nerve their actions took. Women had been edging their scarves back for years, but taking one off in daylight, above the traffic, where the police could see their naked heads as clearly as everyone else, was something very few women had done in public, since the protests of 1979 and 1980.

Then, in September 2022, Mahsa Jina Amini died in custody of the morality police. Unlike the women on the boxes, she was not an activist: aged 22, a Kurdish woman visiting from Saqqez, a city 600 km west of Tehran, she’d been stopped because her loose headscarf was not covering enough of her hair. Her death brought thousands of people out on to the street in an outpouring of grief and anger. Women burned their headscarves. Cut their hair in front of cameras. Their protests spawned the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, and continued for months. What began as a demand for justice for one woman became a challenge to the compulsory hijab, then to the system itself. The authorities responded with arrests, executions and a repression that has never really stopped. The funerals of the dead became protests in their turn.

What changed was that the morality police largely disappeared from the streets for months afterwards, with no announcement that the patrols had ended. Women who had grown up expecting to be stopped were not being stopped, and they knew why: the government had learned in 2022 what a single arrest could cost.

Azadeh, a woman from Tehran, tells me that, during the 12-day war with Israel in June 2025, the city felt apocalyptic. After the US president Donald Trump posted that people in Tehran should get out of the city, they fled their homes, leaving everything behind, and the city emptied. Checkpoints multiplied as the government waited for an uprising that never came. But in the strange mood that settled on the city following the attacks, Azadeh noticed another change – a bargain that nobody signed: ‘The state began leaving people alone to live as they like, as long as they do not come out into the street about it.’

‘You cannot leave the house in ordinary clothes. You have to be put together’

What is happening in Tehran now is the quiet discarding of rules that have governed daily life for decades. A few inches of visible hair used to be the whole argument, but it is no longer the point. Women up and down the city are removing their scarves and manteaus – the loose, knee-length coats they were required to wear over their clothes in public – and adopting the latest trends: capri trousers, cropped and close-fitting clothes, bare arms, midi skirts, bare legs. Enjoying this new freedom, they parade along Iranshahr (rather aptly, the street takes its name from the old Persian word for the land of the Iranians), where shops that used to sell manteaus and headscarves have switched to blouses and T-shirts.

A young woman whom I’ll call Mina puts the shift in blunter terms. ‘It isn’t optional anymore,’ she said. ‘You cannot leave the house in ordinary clothes. You have to be put together.’ She does not wear a headscarf anymore, and nor does anyone she goes out with. On the streets where people go to be seen, she tells me, hardly anyone does. In Tehran, those who can afford it wear the latest designer clothing. But in small Iranian towns, local workshops turn out such good copies of the latest Parisian and New York trends that anyone can now dress head to toe in ‘Chanel’, whatever their class.

Sima, also from Tehran, says that: ‘Among the women who dress freely there is a kind of solidarity. Nobody talks about it, but everyone feels it.’ Recalling the first time she removed her headscarf, Sima says: ‘I felt bald … I thought everyone was looking at me, and I kept checking.’ She was frightened, she told me, so she kept a headscarf in her bag ready to whip out if anything should happen. It took a while for the feeling to pass. Each time she went out, she saw more women without headscarves and that gave her heart. She knew that she was not alone.

The easy read on these developments, especially outside Iran, is that this is defiance: using clothing as a weapon against the state. The framing is not entirely wrong, but it misses most of what is happening on the street, and the people living it do not describe what they are up to in this way. When I asked Mina if getting dressed felt like a political act, she paused, then said no. ‘When I dress up, it’s only for myself,’ she told me. ‘I’m not doing some political act.’ So what is happening on Iranshahr?

The Iranian sociologist Asef Bayat has spent years asking how ordinary people can change their societies in the absence of formal organisations or conventional political movements. In Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East (2010), he argues that they do it less by protesting than by simply living as they wish to, and in enough numbers and for long enough that the rules have to bend around them. Bayat’s name for what Sima, Mina and Azadeh are describing is ‘the art of presence’. It denotes ‘the courage and creativity to assert collective will in spite of all odds, to circumvent constraints, utilising what is available and discovering new spaces within which to make oneself heard, seen, felt, and realised.’ It is a form of soft power.

The women filling the sidewalks of Iranshahr Street are just ordering coffee and adjusting their sunglasses for a friend’s camera. They never chant slogans. They just hang out and admire each other’s looks. Each person is doing nothing more dramatic than deciding what to wear out of the house. But when thousands of young people make the same decision, on the same stretch of pavement, evening after evening, for months, the arithmetic changes. A protest might be cleared in a night. But a government has a harder time dealing with thousands of people who simply go on living as they want.

On Iranshahr young people filled the street to see who had shown up and how they looked

The morality police have not gone away, but their methods have changed. Stopping a woman in public is expensive now: as the Woman, Life, Freedom protests showed, it can end in months of demonstration, so the pressure has moved away from individuals to the places where women gather, and to the phones in their hands. Over the summer, several of the best-known cafés on Iranshahr and Sanaei Street, another popular hangout spot in Tehran, were shut down on the orders of judicial and police officials. The reasons given for the closures included serving customers who were not wearing the hijab. At least 42 businesses were shuttered across the country in August, and more than 70 social media accounts were blocked or seized. Last year, Tehran’s police chief intimated that plainclothes officers were working inside cafés and at concerts.

However, the state has also learned that it doesn’t always need to be there: a woman who assumes the café she is sitting in is being watched behaves as though it is. Still, the pressure is lighter than the state would ideally like to exert. In September, one senior official complained that ‘war conditions’ were preventing the authorities from enforcing the hijab as fully as they wanted.

As soon as the American-Israeli attacks were launched in February 2026, the government moved to occupy public spaces, fearing another wave of Trump-inspired protests. Every evening, it organised demonstrations of its own supporters, mainly on Vali-Asr, a few blocks west of Iranshahr. Two versions of public life were thus running at once. The government was turning out crowds to show that the public was still with it, while on Iranshahr young people filled the street to see who had shown up and how they looked.

Hair sits at the crossroads of these two versions of public life. For decades, it was kept out of public view, a private fact turned into a legal obligation, but now it is on display everywhere and deliberately so. Why hair? Probably because it is the most visible sign of femininity in public. In January 1936, Reza Shah, founder of the last dynasty to rule Iran before the revolution of 1979, asked his wife Queen Tadj ol-Molouk and their daughters to appear unveiled in public. He had them photographed, unveiled and wearing Western clothes, and distributed the images around the country, while his police went into the streets and pulled the chador off any woman still wearing one.

Black and white photo of three women and a man descending stairs outside a building while another man salutes. Two of the women are dressed in military-style skirt suits, and all three are wearing hats.

Reza Shah’s wife Queen Tadj ol-Molouk and their daughters Shams and Ashraf participating in a public ceremony unveiled, 8 January 1936. Courtesy Wikipedia

Iran’s clergy read the move as a direct challenge. Decades later, the revolution led by that same clergy made covering the hair compulsory. Hair became a political battlefield. Whichever government has held power this century, women’s hair and the streets they walk in have been where the Iranian state shows how much control it still has, because it is the one measure of its power that everybody can see at a glance.

From late December 2025 and into 2026, political protests demanding the end of the government were put down with lethal force, while the street culture of Iranshahr went on. These are not two separate populations. The people I spoke to on Iranshahr had been in those protests themselves. Both crowds were defying the state, but in very different ways, and this difference is easier to see if you start by considering what a crowd actually is.

In Crowds and Power (1960), Elias Canetti argued that a crowd is born at a single moment he called ‘the discharge’:

Before this the crowd does not actually exist; it is the discharge which creates it. This is the moment when all who belong to the crowd get rid of their differences and feel equal.

The protestors in what has been dubbed Tehran’s Crimson Winter were this kind of crowd. Their demonstrations started in the bazaars over the collapse of the currency and the rising price of everything, and within 12 days they had spread to more than 100 cities. Footage showed the main protest growing by the hour, until one of Tehran’s longest boulevards was full, end to end. It may well have been the discharge Canetti describes, of a pressure, years in the building, finally exploding. In the lethal crackdown that followed, human rights monitors verified 7,007 deaths, though some estimates put the toll at more than 30,000.

The Islamic Republic has always tried to control its image and, above all, the image of its own power. What slips out of its hands can be tidied away, as long as nobody is looking. A crowd spreading across the country and shouting that the government must go cannot be tidied away. And so the government must clear the streets to prove its power still has reach.

Repealing compulsory hijabs would be a declaration of defeat, so the law stays on the books, unenforced

The Iranshahr collective is a crowd too, but it is not doing what the winter crowd did. Nobody on Iranshahr is asking the government for anything. Instead, they defy its authority by living in a way it cannot accommodate, but which is quieter and slower and much harder to suppress. This is where Bayat’s idea of the non-movement becomes useful. ‘What you are describing in the streets of Tehran might be explained in terms of non-movement, in the sense that these young people are displaying a kind of lifestyle that defies dominant norms, and in the case of Iran, even unwritten laws,’ he wrote to me.

In his book, Bayat defines non-movements as ‘the collective actions of noncollective actors’. It’s largely a question of conscious intent: ‘In non-movements,’ he told me, ‘actors do not necessarily see their acts as deliberate defiance or resistance. What they aim for is the realisation of an alternative mode of being and doing things that stands counter to the dominant ones.’ Non-movements describe the fragmented, improvised activities of large numbers of ordinary people who are rarely guided by an ideology or a leadership, but that trigger social change all the same. Most of the people making the decision to show up and defy norms, would, as Mina did, describe their choices as personal.

The agency of non-movements ‘rests on the power of big numbers’, as Bayat writes, against which a state may find it lacks the means to reassert control. But more importantly, the non-movement is difficult to police because it offers ‘escapes, spaces, and uncontrolled holes … that can be filled and appropriated by ordinary actors.’ It is the very ordinariness of these small escapes that allows the non-movement to quietly accrete.

The Iranian government made this discovery for itself recently. In 2023, the judiciary drafted a Hijab and Chastity bill that was later passed but never brought into force. Indeed, the Supreme National Security Council of Iran told the legislature not to implement it. Iran’s president Masoud Pezeshkian, who belongs to the reformist camp, admitted on state television that he had ‘many reservations’ about a law he would himself be responsible for promulgating. ‘We risk ruining a lot of things in society because of this law,’ he said. What he was referring to was the erosion of social trust. Enforcing the law would have required people to report each other over the hijab. Friends and families would have turned on one another; a taxi driver who failed to report an uncovered passenger would be fined.

In Bayat’s terms, this is what change from below can look like. In response to women persistently removing the hijab, the government never admitted a defeat. Repealing the existing law on compulsory hijabs would be a declaration of defeat, so the law stays on the books, unenforced, and the enforcement moves to where the political costs are lesser. What is being protected is the image of a state still in charge. If religion was the real concern, as hardliners want it to be, the law would be enforced whatever the cost, but the priority now is the regime and its survival. That is why a woman who removes her headscarf yet says nothing about the government is left alone. For the people of Iran, there has been no single, formal victory of the kind that a movement delivers, and no date to mark it. But the change is there anyway, in a street that looks nothing like it did a few years ago.

The Islamic Republic will no doubt put on a show of strength from time to time, asserting itself with a padlock, a patrol or a gun, but then it will pull back when it meets with people’s ongoing resistance. Each time it pulls back, a little more of its authority is lost, until one day it may find out that it has become something other than it was.

* Some names have been changed for security reasons.



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Im a doctor in training and I believe in a secular world