Review

‘Every Tiny Molecule of Ash’ | Poorna Swami

‘Every Tiny Molecule of Ash’ | Poorna Swami


On a muggy morning in late July, when tens of thousands of protesters thronged to central New Delhi to head toward parliament, they seemed to already have a sense that their march might be historic. Most were students and young graduates, many of whom had traveled from towns hundreds of miles away to attend their very first protest. As I squeezed through the crowd I saw posters with cartoons of a bespectacled, mustached man accompanied by varied fonts spelling the word RESIGN—a reference to the rally’s central demand that India’s education minister, Dharmendra Pradhan, step down after presiding over a disastrous exam-paper leak. But nearly as common were portraits of revolutionaries from the Indian independence struggle: M.K. Gandhi, the Dalit leader B.R. Ambedkar, and, most ubiquitous that day, Bhagat Singh.

Born in 1907 in Banga (in present-day Pakistan), Singh became an anticolonial militant in 1928, when the seven-member Indian Statutory Commission—popularly known as the “Simon Commission” after its chief, John Simon—arrived in India to assess conditions for constitutional reforms. As it moved from city to city across the colony, the commission, which had no Indian members, was met with swarms of protesters chanting “Simon go back.” At a demonstration in Lahore led by the Indian nationalist Lala Lajpat Rai, the police brutally beat protesters; Rai soon died of his injuries.

Singh and his associates, seeking to avenge Rai’s death, plotted to assassinate the superintendent who had authorized the police violence, but they ended up killing the wrong man. Singh evaded arrest until four months later, in April 1929, when he and a comrade threw small, non-lethal bombs inside Delhi’s Central Legislative Assembly, hoping to incite a “proletariat revolution.” Rather than turn fugitive again, Singh stayed on the scene, shouting revolutionary slogans and then submitting to arrest. In the widely publicized trial that followed, he used the courtroom to spread an anticolonial message, especially to the country’s youth. In prison he went on hunger strike, calling for better treatment for Indian political prisoners. Until his death he maintained that his acts of violence weren’t “aimless outrages” but calculated political moves toward freedom. “Let me announce with all the strength at my command, that I am not a terrorist,” he wrote from Lahore Central Jail in 1931, less than two months before he was hanged.

On a banner pegged to a metal fence beside the road that morning in Delhi, Singh appeared in an oval frame flanked by his comrades Rajguru and Sukhdev, who were executed with him. Nearby, a man pressed through the crowd wearing a white t-shirt adorned with black-marker lettering: “GLORY TO BHAGAT SINGH.” Many of the marchers’ signs and posters bore a particular studio portrait of Singh in a felt hat tilted to the left. In it his face is clean-shaven except for a wiry mustache that barely obscures his otherwise boyish appearance. Emblazoned in Hindi beneath one replica of the image that day—on a poster produced by a left-wing student group—was the phrase “Looks like I gotta come back, bro.”

Although the nonviolent student protesters had markedly different methods than Singh’s, he nonetheless seemed to symbolize something central to their struggle. In a sense this was hardly surprising. Nearly eighty years after India gained independence, the rhetoric of national integrity still dominates public life, even in everyday chatter. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Hindu-nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which has governed the country since 2014, claims to be restoring the land to precolonial glory, while its critics call to safeguard the nation’s “true” inclusive values against such divisive forces. It isn’t uncommon for Indian protests to invoke historical figures in this spirit. In recent years Gandhi and Ambedkar have emerged as a diptych embodying the secular constitutional principles on which the Indian republic was founded, while Singh—long an emblem of radical left-wing student politics—has been idealized, even coopted, by groups across the political spectrum. The mythology of this young man feverishly dedicated to his country has been immortalized in several Bollywood films, with rousing dialogue about how “freedom” was his “bride” and violent scenes of him being force-fed by the British while on hunger strike.

But his renewed prominence at this protest still felt significant. Those signs and posters at once suggested the growing influence of left-wing student activism in this moment and pointed to a more expansive sensibility among the crowd. By turning to a student leader from the colonial past, the many nonaffiliated protesters, too, seemed to argue that they were fighting to reform not just a few untenable policies but the nation itself. Over the four weeks that the protests gathered strength, this broad-brush anticolonial rhetoric came to have complicated implications. It allowed thousands of people with discrepant political leanings to position themselves as a righteous collective and contest Modi’s monopoly on the language of national preservation; it also downplayed the real political divisions among the protesters and the concerns of the communities, especially Muslims, who have borne the brunt of public dissent in recent years.

The protesters frequently invoked the past, but their movement’s direct triggers were squarely in the present. In May of this year a group of experts hired by the National Testing Agency allegedly leaked the questions for the government’s centralized medical entrance exam after 2.27 million candidates had taken the test. This was hardly the first time in recent memory that a major public exam’s results had been invalidated because of administrative negligence. Over the last five years at least forty-five major exams have been similarly leaked. In a country with a harrowingly competitive education system and an increasingly bleak job market (nearly 40 percent of graduates under twenty-five are unemployed), such leaks are reported to have driven dozens of students to suicide over the last decade.

Only three days after this latest leak, the chief justice of the Indian Supreme Court unwittingly exacerbated the situation when he made a comment likening unemployed youth to “cockroaches.” As the online response escalated, Abhijeet Dipke, a Boston University graduate based in the US, joked on social media: “What if all cockroaches come together?” The proposition quickly gathered earnest supporters, who rallied under the banner of the “Cockroach Janata Party” (CJP). Calling themselves the “voice of the lazy and unemployed,” they soon steered their efforts toward a mass youth campaign for educational reform. In a broken public education system, they declared, accountability would begin only once Pradhan resigned.

It wasn’t a small demand. Dozens of crises had come and gone during Modi’s twelve years in power, from the overnight demonetization of high-value currency to widespread mismanagement of the Covid-19 pandemic, without a single cabinet minister stepping down. Pradhan was a crucial member both of the BJP and of Modi’s inner circle, having secured the party’s victory in the state of Odisha. To call for his resignation was to challenge the highest rung of a famously unyielding government.

The CJP is in numerous respects a regulated organization: it has a declared leadership, official spokespeople, and now even a working committee. From its earliest days, however, it adamantly professed that it wasn’t a political or ideological party, and soon it had the support of groups with competing visions for the movement. Left-wing organizations like the All India Students Association (AISA) and the Students Federation of India (SFI)—both affiliated with Indian communist parties—had rallied against the government’s educational policies for several years, and both of them backed the CJP’s demands. Seasoned at protesting across Delhi’s college campuses and streets, these groups attracted swaths of student supporters; they also formed organized blocs within an otherwise largely spontaneous show of dissent.

In the third week of June a motley constellation of protesters started camping out at Jantar Mantar, a backstreet in central Delhi authorized by police as the city’s venue for demonstrations. When it became clear that the government had little intention of engaging with the agitators’ demands, the prominent Ladakhi education and environmental activist Sonam Wangchuk went on hunger strike in support of the cause. Three students from AISA joined him, invoking their hero Bhagat Singh. Although AISA and Wangchuk disagreed on several crucial points (Wangchuk supported the controversial National Education Policy implemented by the government in 2020, while AISA called for it to be scrapped entirely), they continued to fast alongside each other for the next three weeks.

The CJP leaders and Wangchuk sat on an imposing stage at one end of the meagre site, while students set up smaller tents on either side. Throughout the day they beat a drum, chanting slogans—“Long live the revolution!” “Dharmendra Pradhan, resign, resign!”—while their fasting comrades lay on low platforms behind them. Soon images started traveling across social media of the fifty-nine-year-old educator and the self-sacrificing students being propped up by aides just to get to the bathroom. Sympathizers flocked to Jantar Mantar in larger and larger numbers. Then, on July 18, Delhi police intruded on the scene. They bundled away Wangchuk behind a cordon of white bedsheets, claiming they were under court orders to hospitalize him.

Videos of the operation burned through social media. If the government hoped that removing Wangchuk would quell the protests, it had just the opposite effect: overnight he became a symbol of the Modi government’s apathy toward the country’s education crisis. Two days later, on July 20, the streets around Jantar Mantar were bursting, far beyond anyone’s expectations, with protesters ready to march to parliament. By then I had resolved to show up at Jantar Mantar every day, hoping to observe the movement from up close.

That morning the police had deemed the rally an unlawful assembly, and signboards on the road leading to Jantar Mantar warned people they were breaking the law just by attending. Five metro stations in the vicinity had been sealed and mobile Internet services suspended, so that people in one section of the protest had no sense of what was happening in another. Barricaded by police and paramilitary forces into a tiny area (less than a kilometer at its widest), the crowd jostled for an exit route. I pushed my way through from Parliament Street back to the Janpath metro station, and then toward the Press Club on Raisina Road.

As the demonstration swelled outward from Jantar Mantar, police and paramilitary troops from the Rapid Action Force—few of whom seemed to be wearing their standard identifying badges—shot several rounds of tear gas into the crowd. The people around me ran in panic, some almost trampling each other. When I met up with colleagues a safe distance away, one of them told me the police had cleared the stage and pulled down the tents that had sheltered the camping strikers at the protest’s center. A few streets away, a friend reported, police had beaten unarmed marchers with batons, leaving a number of people with fractured limbs and bleeding heads. Later, as I walked along the emptied streets, I saw scattered protesters hobbling with bruises on their legs. Shoes and slippers lay strewn on the road. In a couple of hours videos would make the rounds online of masked men in plainclothes beating protesters alongside the uniformed officers; the police haven’t clarified who they were.

Eyewitnesses uploaded videos over the next twenty-four hours, and it emerged that paramilitary officers had fired into the crowd with “pellet” shotguns at another spot in central Delhi. Until now such guns, which lodge small metal pellets beneath the skin of anyone in the line of fire, had been a trademark of Indian security forces’ tactics in Kashmir, where the weapons have injured thousands of civilians, blinded more than a hundred, and killed more than a dozen since they were introduced for crowd control in 2010. The firing around Jantar Mantar was the first known instance of law enforcement using them in the national capital. Indian and international media would soon confirm that a number of protesters were treated for pellet injuries at local hospitals; at least two had been hit with multiple pellets in the face and neck.

But these violent tactics, too, soon backfired: by evening, enraged by the brutal treatment of their classmates and peers, hundreds of protesters had reclaimed the demolished encampment and the areas surrounding it. By the next day the crowd seemed to have multiplied fourfold. As videos of the attacks spread through social media, supporters swarmed to Jantar Mantar from across the country. Some brought food and water; others volunteered as garbage cleaners. Within two days the crowd had grown into a sticky mass of bodies with barely any space between them. Meanwhile, dozens of satellite protests of varying sizes formed in cities and towns hundreds of miles from the capital. At Jantar Mantar I met a shoe factory worker from Agra, a bike mechanic from Meerut, and an accountant who had a stable job in Delhi, all of whom had turned out in support of the students after seeing the scenes of violence. They had come, as the mechanic told me, for “India’s future.”

Each of the disparate groups converging on Jantar Mantar brought their own grievances. Some were frustrated they hadn’t been able to find work for years, despite the government’s promises that the job market would improve. Others were sick of seeing the Modi administration double down on religious propaganda but neglect issues like education, health care, and the toll of inflation. Still others wanted to draw attention to environmental crises abetted by the government and its billionaire allies. Many were veterans of anti-caste organizing (Dipke is himself Dalit and a professed Ambedkarite), while others were, as several admitted to me, longtime BJP supporters. What started as a protest about education was now a mélange of every possible complaint against Modi’s regime.

Previous surges of demonstrations against the BJP—including the protests against the flagrantly anti-Muslim Citizenship (Amendment) Act in 2019–2020 and the farmers’ protests in 2020—had been led by marginalized groups. The state singled out these communities, and especially Muslims, for violent repression in response; there were no large protests against this targeted crackdown. Memories of those episodes were still fresh when the recent youth protests got underway, and many Muslim students felt wary about further risking their safety to join a movement that made little explicit reference to Muslim persecution. But after the police started brutalizing dominant-caste Hindus, too, something began to shift. Finding themselves under direct fire for the first time, the majority grew bolder about standing up to the state. Some protesters, however cautiously, even started criticizing the government’s anti-Muslim actions.

Arun Sankar/AFP/Getty Images

A protester fleeing tear gas fired by Rapid Action Force personnel during the Cockroach Janta Party’s march on parliament, New Delhi, July 20, 2026

This shift was most apparent in the way the protesters changed their target after the bloodbath on July 20. Now, more than Pradhan, most of the agitators seemed to direct their anger at Modi himself. I heard several groups demand the prime minister’s resignation, with some shouting “Whenever Modi is scared, he pits Hindus against Muslims.” “FUCK MODI” graffiti spread around the area; rhyming chants called the prime minister a coward, a monkey, and a pimp. With increasing frequency, people also brought AI-generated, often misogynistic caricatures that depicted Modi as a voluptuous prostitute “asking for it” or as a servile tradwife groveling before Donald Trump.

But the protesters’ disaffection was hardly unified. Walking through the crowd after July 20, it wasn’t difficult to see the faultlines. When anti-caste groups waving blue flags shouted “Jai Bhim” in praise of Ambedkar, young people who admitted having until recently had Hindu-nationalist sympathies shouted in unison with them. The odd person even attempted to add “Jai Shri Ram”—a hallmark of anti-Muslim rhetoric—to the chorus. At one point CJP leaders, evidently hoping to keep up the pretense that their movement wasn’t “political,” tried to stop protesters from initiating a popular call-and-response sequence calling for azadi (“freedom”) that has been associated with demands for Kashmiri independence, a view considered seditious under Indian law. Students from left-wing groups chanted with gusto all the same.

In one sense the campaign owed its energy and its numbers precisely to its non-ideological posture. This was a generation of protesters that had only ever known life under the BJP, and to many of them rejecting that politics seemed to require rejecting political commitments wholesale. By claiming to focus on nondenominational issues like exam leaks, many of the demonstrators were also, in effect, arguing that they didn’t deserve the state’s retaliation.

None of this prevented the movement from adopting a more audacious style than any other in recent years. In a culture that hammers on about respecting one’s elders and figures of authority, these young protesters chose to make profanity their lingua franca. Several flaunted sexualized posters: “Daddy, beat me,” “Arrest me but make it sexy,” “My life is so blessed that I got to fuck Dharmendra Pradhan in the ass.” The effect of this new tone is hard to overstate: it did profound damage to Modi’s stoic, sage-like image, which until now he had used to cast himself as a father figure for the nation.

But after the mass violence a more focused political critique also started to emerge around Jantar Mantar. Recalling the Simon Commission’s unceremonious welcome, fresh graffiti on barricades read “MODI GO BACK” and “SIMON COME BACK.” On a wall close by, another slogan in Hindi invoked the British official who, in 1919, ordered the army to open fire onto a crowd of unarmed civilians at Jallianwala Bagh in Amritsar: “OUR PRIME MINISTER IS A COWARD. HE’S ANOTHER GENERAL DYER.” At a press conference Delhi’s former chief minister, Arvind Kejriwal, of the Aam Aadmi Party, echoed the sentiment: “What General Dyer did at Jallianwala Bagh has been surpassed by Modi.”

If the protesters wanted to gain the sympathies of Indians across the country, they knew, they had to appeal to a universal sense of patriotism. Over the years the BJP has used film, pop music, and straight-up oratory propaganda to bolster its reputation as India’s historic defender. Just last November Modi declared that his government would free the country from its degenerate “colonial mindset” by reviving the region’s Hindu past. By likening Modi’s administration to colonizers, a demographically broad set of people at Jantar Mantar were, with striking success, taking this mythos apart.

The BJP rebuked the protesters using all the expected slurs, from “anti-national” to “terrorists.” There was a certain irony here—for the BJP’s own origins lie in another mass student movement with far more militant tactics. In the 1970s campus protests in the states of Gujarat and Bihar snowballed into a comprehensive agitation against government corruption. The students, who blockaded roads and torched government buildings, eventually called for the resignation of Indira Gandhi, who was then the prime minister. Although led by a generally nonpartisan activist named Jayaprakash Narayan, the students were supported by an unlikely coalition of Indira’s opponents—including members of the Jana Sangh, which would go on to become the BJP. An important share of the movement’s organizational direction, too, had come from the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP), the student wing of the Hindu-supremacist Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which is the ideological parent organization of the BJP.

Over Modi’s three terms in office, the BJP government has literally rewritten history textbooks, glorifying Hindu figures and vilifying Muslim ones. In the same revisionist spirit, the party seems to have worked to expunge the memory of the student activism that was so crucial to its own rise. Now that another brand of students is confronting Modi’s government not unlike how the BJP’s forebears did Indira’s, history seems to be repeating itself—much to the ruling party’s inconvenience.

Today, any youth movement that wants to seriously contest Modi’s claim on India’s past and future will have to contend directly with the Hindu-nationalist dimensions of the BJP’s repression. At Jantar Mantar, a number of factions—especially the left-wing student groups—repeatedly called attention to the government’s manipulation of caste and religion, often drawing on ideas developed by earlier iterations of the student movement under BJP rule.

Back in 2016, when Modi had barely been in office for two years, student protests erupted across the country, with caste at their center. Their immediate catalyst was the news that Rohith Vemula, a Ph.D. student at the University of Hyderabad in southern India who identified as Dalit, had died by suicide after university authorities revoked his on-campus housing, accusing him and four other members of the Ambedkar Students Association of roughing up an ABVP student leader. Vemula strongly denied the allegation, arguing that he was being targeted because of his caste and his participation in anti-caste Ambedkarite organizing. “The value of a man was reduced to his immediate identity,” he wrote in his suicide note, referring to his Dalit background. “My birth is my fatal accident.”

Nearly a thousand miles away at Delhi’s Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), a small set of students went on hunger strike in solidarity with students in Hyderabad. The next month a larger group attempted to march to the Education Ministry, demanding the implementation of the Rohith Vemula Act to curb caste discrimination in higher education. As campus protests spread across India (and the police retaliated with baton assaults), reports circulated that the BJP had pressured the University of Hyderabad’s authorities in the weeks leading up to Vemula’s death. (BJP ministers denied any irregular involvement in the university’s decisions.) Soon students and academics were calling for Smriti Irani, then the minister for Human Resources Development, to resign. Nothing came of that ultimatum, though Irani was “demoted” to textile minister as part of a cabinet reshuffle five months later.

During those months of unrest, a twenty-eight-year-old Muslim Ph.D. student at JNU named Umar Khalid emerged as a central figure in the broader movement. In February 2016 the Delhi police accused him and a handful of other left-leaning students of “sedition” after they organized an event marking the death anniversary of Mohammed Afzal, a Kashmiri man who had been controversially executed for a gun attack outside India’s parliament building in 2001. Hindu-nationalist sympathizers called Khalid a “Pakistani agent,” and he went into hiding. But a few days later he snuck onto JNU’s campus late at night to address a group of students, standing in front of a banner that read #JusticeForRohith.

“Friends, my name might be Umar Khalid but I am not a terrorist,” he told the crowd. Speaking into a janky microphone, he emphasized not just the injustice of his own persecution—“the way, to quote Rohith Vemula, I was reduced to my immediate identity”—but the crisis facing India’s entire higher education system. Since the BJP had come to power, students and professors had accused the government of suppressing speech on university campuses by appointing allies of the RSS in top administrative posts and making moves to overhaul syllabi. Now Khalid declared that this was “the struggle of every university in this country.” It was the responsibility of students, he insisted, to resist the corrosion of education under right-wing rule: “A university that does not teach dissent becomes a prison.” Two days later Khalid surrendered to the police. He spent nearly a month behind bars before being granted bail.

Mayank Makhija/NurPhoto/Getty Images

Umar Khalid addressing the crowd at Jantar Mantar during a protest against the passage of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, New Delhi, December 24, 2019

Over the years that followed, student protests would become a notable exception in a mostly cowering public sphere. In 2019, amid nationwide agitation against the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, Muslim women in Delhi led a highway-blockading sit-in, supported by students at JNU and two prominent Muslim universities, Jamia Milia Islamia and Aligarh Muslim University. Police broke into Jamia’s and AMU’s campuses and attacked students with batons and tear gas; at JNU a mob wielding iron rods and stones beat up students and teachers and vandalized buildings. Several eyewitnesses told Human Rights Watch that they identified a number of ABVP members in the mob, although none were officially held responsible and the group denied involvement. On January 27, 2020, at a rally in Delhi, a BJP minister led a chant of “shoot the traitors,” referring to Muslim protesters allied with the sit-in. Seemingly inspired by the minister’s comment, three days later a vigilante fired a pistol at protesters near Jamia’s campus.

Weeks later, another BJP minister threatened to take matters into his own hands if the police didn’t remove the protesters choking highways around the city. Groups of Hindu men gathered at various locations, and soon northeast Delhi was consumed by violence, first between the protests’ supporters and opponents, and then between Hindus and Muslims. A woman was burned alive, men were shot, and mosques, schools, and shops were set ablaze. Calm was restored only three days later, after paramilitary forces arrived at the scene. It was the worst Hindu-Muslim violence the capital had seen in decades, with fifty-three people killed, thirty-eight of them Muslim.

These riots coincided with Trump’s arrival in Delhi for his first state visit to India. While there is no evidence that Khalid, who had graduated but remained an activist, was even in Delhi back then, seven months later the Delhi police, who answer to the central government, arrested him for allegedly masterminding the violence. He was held, along with several other Muslim student activists, under the draconian Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967, which effectively enables the government to keep people in pre-trial detention indefinitely, without bail.

Six years later, Khalid and Sharjeel Imam, another JNU history student, remain incarcerated. In a testimony published earlier this year, after the Supreme Court denied him and Imam bail, Khalid wrote that he found strength in knowing he was part of “a history that shall be penned for the future.” As a reminder, he said he had etched a quote from Bhagat Singh’s prison notebook on the wall of his cell: “Every tiny molecule of ash is in motion with my heat/I am such a Lunatic that I am free even in Jail.” 

By now Khalid was seen as a dangerous revolutionary in his own right. To the authorities, the very mention of his name at the recent youth protests was threatening. In Bangalore a woman carrying a “Free Umar Khalid” poster saw it confiscated by police. Another woman at the same protest, who had held up a sign that included the phrase “Long live Umar Khalid,” was hunted down by police through CCTV surveillance footage; she was later slapped with an incident report, with an investigation underway. When, according to reporting from The Indian Express, some protesters were said to have brought “Free Umar Khalid” posters to a solidarity demonstration in Goa, the local police detained at least two people and grilled them about whether they knew of Khalid’s “background” and if they had shouted slogans in his support (and if so, how many times). Among the two hundred and forty points in the questionnaire the police gave them was the question: “What is your understanding of the words ‘Free Umar Khalid?’”

But Khalid had also become a vexed symbol for the protesters themselves. When a BJP minister tried to malign the protests by dredging up a CJP spokesperson’s old tweets in support of Khalid, the CJP leader in question seemed to sidestep expressing a view on Khalid’s imprisonment, saying only that the group was focused on educational reform. This hesitance disappointed the CJP’s allies on the left, who argued that Khalid’s story was part of the same student struggle. Several weeks later, Neha Bora, the AISA leader who went on hunger strike, declared: “Umar Khalid is not a question of nationalist or anti-national…. It is a question of what kind of country we want to build.”

Some protesters tried to censor mentions of Khalid among the crowd for fear of government retribution, pleading with fellow demonstrators to put away their FREE UMAR KHALID signs. Yet I saw others at the actions brandish copies of Fractured Communities, Khalid’s recently published Ph.D. dissertation on the history of eastern Indian indigenous groups under British rule. One protester also held up a handwritten poster, an intimation of the significance of Khalid’s thinking and organizing, that gained particular approval on social media: “UMAR KHALID walked so Gen Z could run.”

Now that they, too, found themselves labelled “anti-national terrorists,” perhaps this segment of young protesters were coming to understand what Khalid had long preached. In his view an authoritarian government can only be fought if students build bridges between their struggles and those of Muslims, Dalits, laborers, indigenous communities, and peasants—if, that is, they fight Hindu nationalism head-on. Although the mainstream of the recent student protests has tried hard to avoid this kind of direct attack, in the protests’ aftermath the state’s own behavior is forcing them to drop the façade that their actions have no ideological dimension: Muslim volunteers have faced detentions and vigilante violence, and in his Independence Day speech Modi equated dissidents with Maoist separatists, calling them “intellectual naxals.” By early August Dipke, the CJP’s founder, was pressed to admit that Khalid deserved a fair trial.

Four days after the state ruthlessly cracked down at Jantar Mantar, the movement seemed desperate for some kind of payoff. A few hundred meters away from the center of the protest site, on the road toward parliament, I observed hundreds of demonstrators facing down police and paramilitary troops. A chain of harried volunteers tried to keep sections of the crowd from escalating the confrontation. Then, unexpectedly, past midnight, Wangchuk broke his fast. Sharing a photo of BJP officials surrounding his hospital bed, he said they had promised to address the protesters’ concerns in parliament. Less than an hour earlier Modi had appeared in a selfie-style Instagram video, vowing to pass an education reform bill.

The CJP’s leaders expressed relief at the prospect of Wangchuk’s recovery but distanced themselves from his decision to make peace with BJP ministers, keeping the protest going without him. Online, meanwhile, neither Modi’s tacky video nor—as one social media user put it—its late-night “fuckboy” timing went over well with its intended Gen Z audience; a barrage of reels mocked his nostril-focused camerawork, drawling tone, and labored attempts to sound cool by addressing protesters as “friends.”

The following day police fired several rounds of tear gas on Parliament Street. Some protesters toppled barricades; earlier I had seen people perched on trees, hurling empty water bottles and sticks at the officers, and now a larger number launched similar objects from the ground. The police in turn beat the demonstrators they could grab from the fast-receding crowd. Minutes later, Pradhan, the education minister, announced his resignation on X. (Conspicuously, he didn’t admit to any wrongdoing.)

As the news spread through the crowd, people shrieked and jumped. Cries of “We won!” and “Long live the revolution!” rang out. A few hours later the CJP, saying that the government had assured them it wouldn’t penalize protesters in the coming days, called the protest to an end. For most of the demonstrators it was a day of victory, although others worried that the protests had been called off prematurely, just when the movement had gathered steam. While celebrating with their friends, some students told me they wondered what else they could have demanded had they kept going.

Ishant Choudhan/Hindustan Times/Getty Images

Crowds at the youth protest gathering as news spread of Dharmendra Pradhan’s resignation as education minister, New Delhi, July 25, 2026

In the following days, skepticism over the government’s olive branch would prove to be justified. Overnight, as the police cleared the protest site of people and paraphernalia, the government started reneging on its promise not to retaliate. More than a hundred protesters across the country found themselves facing criminal charges; The Indian Express reported that the Delhi police, scavenging through piles of garbage at Jantar Mantar for labeled packaging, targeted restaurants in the city that had supplied food to protesters. Attempting to salvage the situation, the CJP threatened to reestablish the encampment. The government then scrambled to assure the CJP it would hold up its end of the bargain—although more than a month later it has refused to provide the Supreme Court with a list of incident reports against protesters so the court can dismiss those cases.

The Modi regime seems to be waiting for the discontent to blow over. Opposition leaders have been calling for parliamentary debate about the protests, but the government has refused to come to the table. Pradhan has been replaced by another, arguably still more Hindu-supremacist education minister, Pralhad Joshi, who also has fewer educational qualifications than his predecessor. (In 2022 Joshi defended the premature release of eleven Hindu men convicted of raping a Muslim woman.) Delhi police, meanwhile, have directed social media platforms to remove any content with what one report calls “offensive remarks” against the prime minister.

On July 31 Modi released another selfie video “forgiving” the “naughty children” who had used abusive language against him, but an army of online trolls—which in another instance The Washington Post has directly linked to the BJP’s IT infrastructure—continued to bombard women protesters with rape and death threats. A fifteen-year-old girl who called the prime minister a “dick” was forced to issue a public apology because of a hate campaign that has by now forced her and her family to move.

The movement, however, seems to be pushing on. In the past months it has, on the whole, left the capital for the inner reaches of the country. In the eastern state of Jharkhand, college students went on hunger strike to protest irregularities in a state employment exam. Delegations from both AISA and the CJP traveled to Jharkhand in support before embarking on separate nationwide advocacy tours. After nearly a month of protesting, the Jharkhand students suspended their agitation when the state government, which is not allied with the BJP, conceded to some of their demands. More recently in August, police in the BJP-ruled state of Bihar fired water canons at protesters marching to the chief minister’s house to insist that the state administer its recruitment exams more fairly. A panel of students, part of the wider education-related protests in Bihar, later agreed to call off the agitation after the government acquiesced to a major demand.

The most surprising development is the movement’s broadening constituency. Schoolchildren in various parts of India have been striking for more teaching staff and better facilities, a trend that social media users have described as “Gen Alpha rising.” The CJP, which has chosen to remain a pressure group rather than enter electoral politics, has now adopted primary education as its next big cause.

The movement’s diffuse quality is both its strength and its greatest challenge. While it’s senseless to expect any mass protest to be doctrinaire, it would also be foolish to try to separate out the BJP’s administrative failures from its clear ideological project. If the movement wants to keep up the pressure and eventually force some kind of consequential electoral change, it will in all likelihood have to marry its ecumenical demands with a more explicit indictment of the BJP’s unrelenting schismatic politics.

Generations of the country’s student protesters have stressed precisely this point. Six years into his imprisonment, Umar Khalid composed a public letter to Rohith Vemula: “Dear Rohith, On a cold starry night, I look at the sky from my prison cell. I spot the brightest star and imagine it’s you smiling at me from up there.” Khalid wished that Vemula was with him in freedom, so they could not just compare their “frustrations” and “romances” but “debate and decipher what went wrong in the life of this Republic.” It was clear to him that this sort of political consciousness among students was what the government was so desperate to preempt. “By pushing you to death and by putting me in prison, they ensured that this conversation could never materialise,” he wrote. “Because this is what the regime fears—young thinking people.”



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